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Abstract: 
 
 
This thesis examines foundational questions in behavioral economics—also called 
psychology and economics—and the neural foundations of varied sources of utility. We 
have three primary aims: First, to provide the field of behavioral economics with 
psychological theories of behavior that are derived from neuroscience and to use those 
theories to identify novel evidence for behavioral biases. Second, we provide neural and 
micro foundations of behavioral preferences that give rise to well-documented empirical 
phenomena in behavioral economics.  Finally, we show how a deep understanding of the 
neural foundations of these behavioral preferences can feed back into our theories of 
social preferences and reference-dependent utility.  
 
 
The first chapter focuses on classical conditioning and its application in identifying the 
psychological underpinnings of a pricing phenomenon. We return to classical 
conditioning again in the third chapter where we use fMRI to identify varied sources of 
utility—here, reference dependent versus direct utility—and cross-validate our 
interpretation with a conditioning experiment. The second chapter engages social 
preferences and, more broadly, causative utility (wherein the decision-maker derives 
utility from making or avoiding particular choices).  
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Abstract. Consider choosing a meal in a restaurant by reading a text-based menu, looking at a 
picture-based menu, or being exposed to a buffet table. Does this affect the choices that you 
would make? This paper describes a series of laboratory experiments studying whether the form 
in which items are displayed at the time of choice affects the dollar value that subjects place on 
them. We sell foods and trinkets to subjects using a Becker-DeGroot auction under three 
different conditions: (1) text displays, (2) image displays, and (3) displays of the actual items. 
We  find  that  subjects’  willingness-to-pay is between 40 and 61% higher when they were 
presented with the real items, as compared to the text or image displays. Furthermore, a series of 
follow-up experiments suggest the presence of the real item matters because it triggers pre-
programmed consummatory Pavlovian processes that promote behaviors that lead to contact with 
appetitive items whenever they are present and accessible.  
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A basic principle in many social science models is that choices among objects should not 
vary with innocuous changes in the procedure by which they are made, or with their description. 
In  this  “consequentialist”  view,  choices  should  only  depend  on  their  likely consequences. 
Ordering groceries online and shopping in a store should lead to identical contents in the 
refrigerator at home (holding information about quality and other relevant variables constant).  
However, many experiments have shown that the cognitive processes that guide choice 
appear to violate description-invariance and consequentialism.  A large research effort in 
psychology  is  devoted  to  studying  the  ways  in  which  preferences  are  “constructed”  (see  S.  
Lichtenstein and P. Slovic, 2006, for a recent compendium of articles).  Economists are 
increasingly interested in what policies make sense if preferences are constructed (e.g., D. 
McFadden, 2006). And more recent efforts in neuroeconomics focus on the computational and 
neurobiological mechanisms used in the computation and comparison of values (for a recent 
review see A. Rangel et al., 2008).  
Most of the constructed-preferences studies describe goods or services abstractly and alter 
descriptions without changing consequences. For example, in one classic study medical students 
were asked to choose between hypothetical surgery and radiation treatment options. Outcomes 
were  described  in  terms  of  mortality  statistics  in  one  “frame”,  and  in  terms  of  survival  statistics  
in another frame, while maintaining statistical equivalence (B. J. McNeil et al., 1982). Medical 
students and physicians made different choices when faced with the different frames. In practice, 
differences in physical displays of goods also appear to be important. For example, marketing 
firms spend enormous resources creating the packaging of a product (which is typically later 
discarded), the lighting and location of sales displays, the selection and training of salespeople, 
and so forth.  
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This paper extends the literature on constructed-preferences by studying whether the form in 
which items are displayed affects the value that subjects place on them. We compare three 
conditions: a text display, a picture display, and putting the actual items in front of subjects. We 
investigate these three conditions because of their theoretical interest and because they 
approximate some archetypes of situations in which consumers often find themselves. Consider, 
for example, choosing a meal in a restaurant by reading a text-based menu, looking at a picture-
based menu (as is common in some countries), or being exposed to a buffet table. 
 We describe the results of two separate experiments suggesting that, in comparison to a 
text or high-resolution displays, the physical presentation of a food item or a trinket has a sizable 
effect on its value (as measured by incentive-compatible monetary bids). This presents a puzzle 
for the behavioral sciences, and especially for the emerging field of neuroeconomics: Why do the 
brain’s  valuation  systems  treat  these  three  types  of  displays  so differently? 
We propose and test three different explanations of the real-exposure effect based on recent 
research in psychology and neuroscience. Our results suggest that Pavlovian consummatory 
mechanisms, which are unfamiliar to economists but have been well established in behavioral 
neuroscience, might be at work (B.W. Balleine et al., 2008, A. Rangel et al., 2008, B. Seymour et 
al., 2007). The function of these mechanisms is to deploy behaviors that lead to the consumption 
of appetitive items when those items are physically exposed to them. Furthermore, these types of 
processes are thought to influence behavior by changing the value that the brain assigns to 
particular items.  
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I. EXPERIMENT 1: BASIC FOOD EXPERIMENT 
 
A. METHODS 
 
Fifty-seven Caltech undergraduate and graduate students participated in the experiment. 
Individuals were excluded if they had a history of eating disorders, had dieted in the past year, 
were vegetarian, disliked junk food, or were pregnant.  The selection criteria were designed to 
recruit individuals who liked junk food and were not trying to control their diet. Individuals 
received $20 for their participation and provided informed consent. Participants were asked to 
eat and then fast for three hours prior to the experiment. All testing took place in mid-afternoon.  
The experiment took approximately 30 minutes. Subjects were told that they would receive 
$20 for their participation and may receive additional money and food prizes depending on their 
decisions in the experiment. During this initial instruction, we emphasized that no deception was 
used in the experiment.  Subjects received their instructions through a computer monitor. 
At the beginning of the instruction period participants were informed that they would have to 
stay in the lab for an additional 30 minutes at the end of the experiment (regardless of its 
outcome). During this time they were allowed to eat as much as they wanted of the single food 
item they purchased from us during a bidding task, but no other foods or drinks were allowed. If 
they did not purchase an item they still had to stay in the lab for 30 minutes at the end of 
experiment. The foods that they could purchase were 80 different popular snacks such as candy 
bars (e.g., Snickers Bars) and potato  chips  (e.g.,  Lay’s),  which  are  available  at  local  convenience  
stores. 
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Every participant performed three tasks: (1) a liking-rating task, (2) a familiarity-rating task, 
and (3) a bidding task.  
During the liking-rating task subjects had to answer the question  “How  much  would  you  like  
to  eat  this  item  at  the  end  of  the  experiment?”  on  a  scale  of  -7  (“not  at  all”)  to  7  (“very  much”),  
with 0 denoting indifference. The timeline of the liking-rating trials started with a 1s central 
fixation cross, followed by a 3 s presentation of a high-resolution picture of the item to be rated. 
Pictures were 400x300 pixels in size and showed both the package and the food; the name of the 
food was also displayed above the picture. Afterwards subjects entered their liking rating at their 
own pace using the keyboard. The items were shown in random order. There was a 1 s inter-trial 
interval with an empty screen.  
Familiarity-rating  trials  were  similar  except  that  subjects  answered  the  question  “How  
familiar are you with this item?”  on  a  scale  of  1  (not  much)  to  3  (very  much).  The  purpose  of  
these two tasks was two-fold: First, the liking and familiarity ratings were used in analyses 
reported below. Second, both tasks increased the familiarity of the subjects with the foods and 
their names. 
The bidding trials were the core of the experiment. In addition to the participation fee, each 
subjects received an endowment of $3 that they could use to purchase food from us. At the end 
of the experiment one of the bidding trials was selected by drawing a ball from an urn. The 
subject’s  bid  on  this  selected  trial  determined  whether  he  got  the  item  and  the  price  that  he  had  to  
pay for it.  
Items were sold to the subjects on the selected trial by applying the rules of a Becker-
DeGroot auction. A random number between $0 and $3 dollars (in $0.25 increments) was 
selected from an urn. Let n denote the random number that was selected and let b denote the 
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subject’s  bid.  If  b 
  
  n, the subject got the food item and paid $n. If b < n, the subject did not get 
the item but kept the $3 of bidding money. Note that since the subjects kept whatever funds they 
did not use, they were de facto spending their own money to purchase the food.  
A key feature of the auction procedure is that it satisfies  “incentive  compatibility”:  if  a  
subject’s  true  value  for  an  item  was  v, her best response was to bid exactly v.  Any deviation 
from this strategy resulted in a lower expected payoff. Bidding below v does not save money on 
the price (which is determined by n), it only increases the chance that an item which is liked will 
not be bought.   
Since the rules of the auction are somewhat complicated, we spent significant time training 
the subjects. In particular, we emphasized that their best strategy was to “go  with  their  gut  
feeling”  about  how  much  each  item  was  worth  to  them,  and  then  to  bid  that  amount.    Debriefing  
during a pilot experiment confirmed that subjects complied with these instructions. Furthermore, 
even if there is some bias in bidding relative to true underlying valuation, it should not vary 
systematically with the display treatments.  
The bidding trials were structured as follows: A representation of an item was shown for a 
certain amount of time, and immediately afterward the subjects entered a bid between $0 and $3 
by clicking with a mouse on an analog bid bar. There were three between-subjects experimental 
conditions that differed on how the stimuli were presented in the bidding trials: (1) a text 
condition (N=20), in which only the text descriptor (the product name) was shown, (2) an image 
condition (N=17), in which the high-resolution image of the food was shown, and (3) a real 
condition (N=20), in which an open package of the food item was displayed on a tray. In the text 
and image conditions the item was presented for 3 s and there was a 3 s inter-trial interval. In the 
real condition, the item was also presented for 3 s (although the time was not controlled as 
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precisely) but the inter-trial interval varied since it was determined by the amount of time that it 
took the experimenter to locate the next food and present it to the subject. The real items were 
displayed in a way that resembled the presentation in the images (including the use of a black 
cloth on a tray to resemble the black background of the computer screen). In the text and picture 
conditions data from 6 to 12 subjects was collected in parallel. Each subject received instructions 
and performed the task through his own computer terminal. In the real condition only one subject 
was run at a time.  
 
 
B. RESULTS 
 
Figure 1 provides a succinct description of the results. There are two main results. First, as 
can be seen in the top panel, the average bid in the text condition (68 cents, S.D.=0.52) is 
approximately equal to the average bid in the picture condition (71 cents, S.D.=0.53, two-sided t-
test p=0.88), and both of them are significantly smaller than the average bid in the real condition 
(113 cents, S.D.=0.61 two-sided t-test p<0.004). Note that the average liking ratings were 
marginally higher in the text condition (mean = 1.43), than in the real (mean = 1.16) or picture 
conditions (mean = 0.58), which implies that the effect cannot be attributed to differences in the 
underlying value of the food items. As the bottom panel illustrates, a random effects linear model 
with random intercepts and slopes showed no significant differences between the slopes of the 
bidding curves (i.e., bids as a linear function of liking-rating) in any of the three conditions. 
In order to investigate the possibility that the effect might only work with unfamiliar items, 
we compared average bids for familiar and unfamiliar items. The main effect of displaying the 
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real item was similar across the two groups: for highly familiar items (familiarity rating=3) the 
average bid in the real condition was 50 cents higher than in the two other conditions (p<0.006); 
and for less familiar items (rating <3) the bid difference was 41 cents higher (p<0.001). 
 
 
C. DISCUSSION 
 
These results suggest that the form in which an item is displayed can have a sizable impact 
on  real  choices:  subjects’  willingness-to-pay for snacks increased by 61% when they were 
presented with the real items as opposed to text or image displays.  
Several aspects of the results are worth highlighting. First, contrary to our prior expectations, 
there was no difference between the text and image displays. This is particularly puzzling since 
the text and image displays contain different amounts and types of information. Second, the 
display mode had no effect on the relationship between the liking-ratings, which are an 
independent measure of the consumption value of the items, and the value that is computed at the 
time of bidding. Instead, the real display basically added a constant markup to all of the items. 
Third, subjects bid positive amounts even for some items that they had earlier rated as aversive 
(i.e., negative liking-rating). There are two potential explanations for this. One is that the 
constant exposure to food during the experiment increased their hunger, and thus made some of 
the aversive items desirable. The other is that the liking-rating scale did not do a good job 
picking up the valence of the foods (the mean bid for neutrally rated items was 63 cents, S.D.= 
53). 
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The results raise two important questions. First is the question of robustness: Does the effect 
occur only with foods and hungry subjects? Or, does a similar phenomenon occur in other 
subjective states and for other types of items? The second question has to do with the underlying 
mechanisms generating the effect: What can explain the difference between the text, picture, and 
real conditions?  
A natural hypothesis for economists is that the real condition increases the amount of 
information that subjects have about the goods and that, by decreasing uncertainty, it increases 
their willingness-to-pay for them. This is hard to reconcile with all the evidence. Most of these 
items were highly familiar to our subjects, and the magnitude of the real-condition effect was 
similar for familiar and unfamiliar items. Furthermore, the largest increase in information takes 
place between the text and display conditions, instead of between the display and real ones. 
Finally, additional evidence against the information hypothesis is provided in Experiments 3 and 
4 below. 
Note also that the experiment cannot be explained in terms of changes in transaction costs: 
since only one food item is chosen for consumption at the end of the experiment, the cost of 
actually getting the item is the same across display conditions. 
Instead we developed three alternative hypotheses based on previous findings from 
psychology and neuroscience. The first one focused on the role of odors, which are potentially 
unconscious. Previous research (G. Loewenstein, 1996) has argued that real items, especially 
highly appetitive ones, can trigger visceral urges that affect valuation in a more potent way than 
images or words. Thus, one potential explanation for our findings is that real displays involve the 
sense of smell, and that adding it into the sensory representation of the item might trigger 
emotional responses that affect valuation in a way that images alone do not. In addition, the 
  
11 
11 
activation of multiple sensory representation of the choice item might have a super-additive 
effect on the valuation systems (N. P. Holmes and C. Spence, 2005). 
The second hypothesis is based on the idea that activating the experienced reward circuitry at 
the time of choice might increase the decision value that is assigned to it. In an extreme example 
of  this  phenomenon,  consider  the  impact  that  taking  a  puff  could  have  on  a  smokers’  desire  for  a  
cigarette. Based on this, we hypothesized that exposure to the real items at the time of choice 
might induce an especially strong activation of the experience reward circuitry (in comparison to 
the  picture  and  text  representations)  and  that  this  might  lead  to  an  increase  on  subjects’  
willingness-to-pay. 
The third hypothesis is taken from the animal learning and behavioral neuroscience 
literatures. A sizable and growing body of evidence suggests that environmental cues can have 
an effect on the value assigned to items at the time of choice (B.W. Balleine, N. Daw and J. 
O'Doherty, 2008, A. Rangel, C. Camerer and P. R. Montague, 2008, B. Seymour, T. Singer and 
R. Dolan, 2007). In particular, B.W. Balleine (2005) and B.W. Balleine et al. (2008) have argued 
that the physical presence of an appetitive item can trigger Pavlovian consummatory processes 
that lead animals to make contact with the reward. In the language of animal learning theory, the 
physical presence of the appetitive stimulus (e.g., food) serves as an unconditioned stimulus (US) 
triggering the consummatory response. As with every Pavlovian process, it is possible for 
organisms to learn to associate other cues (called conditioned stimuli, CS) with the presence of 
the US (given by the actual presence of the appetitive item). When the pairing is sufficiently 
strong, the mere presence of the CS can trigger the approach/consummatory responses. This type 
of learning explains, for example, why highly trained pigeons peck at a light that predicts the 
delivery of actual food. 
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According to this hypothesis, the Pavlovian consummatory response is triggered in 
Experiment 1 for the real condition, since the presence of the food serves as a US, but not in the 
text or picture conditions, because these stimuli are not CSs which are as strongly associated 
with the US. Although a priori there is nothing precluding the text or pictures from serving as a 
CS capable of triggering the approach response, the data suggests that they have not acquired the 
required association with the US and thus the pairing is weaker than that in the real treatment. 
One potential reason why this might be the case is that our subjects are unlikely to have been 
trained repeatedly to pair the text and pictorial stimuli with the US. That is, in contexts outside 
the experiment, the names and pictures of foods (e.g., in advertisements) are not frequently 
associated with the presence of the foods, so there is no associative link that can trigger the 
approach response.   
In order to test this third hypothesis, we conjectured that the Pavlovian consummatory 
processes might not be activated in situations in which the items cannot be accessed. This could 
happen because the response is not activated in the first place, or because it is overridden by 
competing behavioral responses that take into account the fact that the stimulus is not accessible.  
The rest of the paper describes the results of three additional experiments designed to address 
the issue of robustness and to investigate the relative contribution of the three proposed 
mechanisms. 
 
II. EXPERIMENT 2: ROBUSTNESS AND THE ROLE OF SMELL 
 
In order to address the issue of robustness, and to investigate the role that smell plays in the 
previous results, we repeated Experiment 1 using trinkets instead of foods.  
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A. METHODS 
 
Sixty Caltech undergraduate and graduate students participated in this experiment. Since the 
design is extremely similar to Experiment 1, here we only describe the differences between them. 
First, instead of snack foods, subjects bid on 20 different small-value trinkets such as Caltech 
mugs and various DVDs. All of the items were sold at the Caltech bookstore at the time of the 
experiment and had a maximum in-store price of $20. Second, subjects were not required to stay 
for 30 minutes at the end of the experiment. Instead, any trinkets purchased during the 
experiment were mailed to them at the end of the day. Third, prospective subjects faced no 
exclusion criteria. Fourth, the trinkets were displayed without any packaging in all of the pictures 
and in the real condition. Twenty subjects participated in each of the conditions. 
 
 
B. RESULTS 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the results. As can be seen in the top panel, the average bid in the text 
condition (1.02 cents, S.D.=0.54) is approximately equal to the average bid in the picture 
condition (1.01 cents, S.D.=0.53, two-sided t-test p=0.9806), and both of them are significantly 
smaller than the average bid in the real condition (142 cents, S.D.=0.61 two-sided t-test 
p<0.008).  This  represents  a  41%  increase  in  the  subjects’  willingness-to-pay for the items, which 
is commensurate with the effect size that we found in Experiment 1. Note that the average liking 
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ratings were not significantly different in the three conditions (minimum p-value in a two-sided 
test 0.45), which implies that the effect cannot be attributed to differences in the underlying 
value of the trinkets. As the bottom panel illustrates, a random effects linear model with random 
intercepts and slopes showed no significant differences between the slopes of the bidding curves 
in any of the three conditions. 
 
 
C. DISCUSSION 
 
A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows that the results for the food and trinket experiments are 
remarkably similar. It follows that the real-exposure effect is not limited to the case of snack 
foods. Furthermore, since smells are unlikely to play a role in the case of the trinkets, we can 
conclude that they are not the mechanism behind the real-exposure effect in both experiments. 
 
 
III. EXPERIMENT 3: THE ROLE OF EXPERIENCED REWARD PROCESSESS 
 
The next experiment addressed the role of experienced reward on the valuation processes. To do 
this we repeated the picture food condition with a twist: subjects had to eat a small sample of 
each food while deciding how much to bid. The idea behind the experiment is that if 
experiencing the rewards generated by an item has a positive effect on valuations, then a taste of 
an appetitive food should have a positive effect on the bids even when it is not physically 
present. 
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A. METHODS 
 
Seventeen Caltech undergraduate and graduate students participated in this experiment. Since the 
design is extremely similar to the picture condition of Experiment 1, here we only describe the 
differences between them. First, instead of 80 snack foods, subjects only placed bids on 20 of 
them. The 20 foods were chosen at random from those used in Experiment 1. We reduced the 
number of foods to facilitate the process of data collection given the additional difficulties 
described below.  
Second, after seeing the picture of the food item, subjects were asked to taste and swallow a 
small amount (about 10 grams) of it prior to entering their bids. This was done as follows. The 
experimenter sat next to the subject and had access to 20 small paper cups, each containing a 
sample of one of the foods. After the image of a food was presented in the screen for 3 seconds 
the experimenter handled a sample of that item to the subject who had to eat it before entering a 
bid. The picture of the food stayed on the screen until a bid was entered. In order to facilitate the 
process of running the experiment, the order of food presentation was randomized but kept 
constant across subjects. 
Note that, in contrast to the real condition in Experiment 1, the subjects were not exposed to 
packages or full samples of the foods. In fact, most of the time subjects did not even take a look 
at the contents of the paper cups since they knew that it was just a sample of the food displayed 
in the screen. 
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B. RESULTS 
 
Figure 3 summarizes the results. For comparison purposes, the figure compares the results of 
this experiment with those of the picture and real conditions in Experiment 1. As can be seen in 
the top panel, the average bid in the taste condition (74 cents, S.D.=0.51) is approximately equal 
to the average bid in the picture condition (70 cents, S.D.=0.53, two-sided t-test p=0.85), but 
substantially smaller than the average bid in the real condition (114 cents, S.D.-0.53, two-sided t-
test p<0.029). Note that the average liking ratings in the taste condition (mean = 2.01) were 
marginally higher than those in the real condition (mean = 1.16), which implies that the effect 
cannot be attributed to differences in the underlying value of the food items. As the bottom panel 
illustrates, a random effects linear model with random intercepts and slopes showed no 
significant differences between the slopes of the bidding curves in any of the three conditions. 
 
 
C. DISCUSSION 
 
The results of this experiment show that giving subjects a taste of the item has no effect on their 
willingness-to-pay when the item is not physically present. In fact, as can be seen in Figure 3, the 
bidding curves for the taste and picture and picture only conditions are nearly identical. These 
results are valuable for two reasons. First, they provide evidence against the hypothesis that 
experienced reward processes are responsible for the real-exposure effect. Second, since getting 
a taste of the item should increase the amount of information that subjects have about the foods, 
it provides further evidence against informational explanations for the effect. 
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IV. EXPERIMENT 4: THE ROLE OF PAVLOVIAN CUES 
 
The final experiment investigated the Pavlovian consummatory mechanisms explanation of the 
real-exposure effect. The experiment is almost identical to the real condition of experiment 
except that we placed a fully transparent Plexiglas wall between the subject and the food, while 
keeping the physical distanced between subject and food constant. Our hypothesis was that if 
consummatory cues are at work, then the presence of a physical barrier would decrease the 
likelihood that the processes would be deployed (because the subjects knew that the barrier made 
the  items  unavailable),  thus  reducing  the  impact  of  real  exposure  on  the  subject’s  willingness-to-
pay. Keep in mind that the use of clear Plexiglas means that all sensory cues are still present, so 
the information hypothesis predicts that the results of this experimental treatment should be 
much like the original finding of a real-exposure effect.  
 
A. METHODS 
 
Thirty Caltech undergraduate and graduate students participated in this experiment. Since the 
design is almost identical to the real condition of Experiment 1, here we only describe the 
differences between them. First, instead of 80 snack foods, subjects only placed bids on 20 of 
them. These were the same 20 foods used in Experiment 3 and were chosen at random from 
those used in Experiment 1. Second, although the physical set-up of the experiment was 
unchanged (including the distance of the experimenter to the subject), a fully transparent 
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Plexiglas wall (dimensions 8 ft by 8 ft by 1/4 inches) was placed midway between the subject 
and the experimenter. The barrier was large enough so that the foods shown by the experiment 
were  out  of  the  subject’s  reach. 
 
 
B. RESULTS 
 
Figure 4 summarizes the results. As before, the figure compares the results of this experiment 
with those of the picture and real conditions in Experiment 1. As can be seen in the top panel, the 
average bid in the Plexiglas condition (81 cents, S.D.=0.53) is approximately equal to the 
average bid in the picture condition (70 cents, S.D.=0.53, two-sided t-test p=0.51), but 
substantially smaller than the average bid in the real condition (114 cents, S.D.-0.53, two-sided t-
test p<0.042). Note that the average liking ratings were marginally higher in the Plexiglas 
condition (mean = 1.62), than in the real condition (mean = 1.16), which implies that the effect 
cannot be attributed to differences in the underlying value of the food items. As the bottom panel 
illustrates, a random effects linear model with random intercepts and slopes showed no 
significant differences between the slopes of the bidding curves (i.e., bids as a liner function of 
liking-rating) in any of the three conditions. 
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C. DISCUSSION 
 
The introduction in the real condition of a transparent Plexiglas barrier between the subject and 
the food, which has no impact on the sensory information available to the subject, reduces the 
willingness-to-pay almost to the level of the picture condition, thus eliminating the real-exposure 
effect. Given that this was a surprising and somewhat farfetched prediction of the Pavlovian 
account, that it is quite hard to explain the effect of the Plexiglas barrier using an alternative 
theory, and that there exists a considerable amount of neural evidence for the presence of these 
types of mechanisms (B.W. Balleine, N. Daw and J. O'Doherty, 2008, A. Rangel, C. Camerer 
and P. R. Montague, 2008, B. Seymour, T. Singer and R. Dolan, 2007), the experiment provides 
significant support in favor of this theory of the real-exposure effect. Note, in addition, that the 
amount of information provided in the real and Plexiglas conditions is identical, and therefore 
the experiment provides further evidence against an informational explanation of the 
phenomenon. 
 
 
V. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The experiments in this study suggest the following three main results. First, the physical 
presence of an accessible appetitive (i.e., desirable) item at the time of choice leads to a sizable 
increase  in  subject’s  willingness-to-pay for it, a phenomenon that we have labeled the real-
exposure effect. Second, the effect is at work in the evaluation of basic rewards such as high-
caloric items for hungry subjects and non-basic rewards such as low value consumer products. 
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Third,  Pavlovian  consummatory  processes  triggered  by  the  item’s  presence  might  be  responsible  
for the real-exposure effect. 
We emphasize three aspects of the Pavlovian consummatory processes theory that we posit 
as a potential explanation for our findings. First, the text and picture of the stimuli do not seem to 
be able to serve as CSs capable of triggering the consummatory response through their 
association with the US given by the actual presence of the food. One potential explanation for 
this finding is that subjects are unlikely to have received extensive training in pairing these 
stimuli with the actual physical presence of the foods, which is the US triggering the Pavlovian 
approach response. Second, the Pavlovian consummatory are not deployed when the stimuli 
cannot be acquired because, for example, it is placed behind a large Plexiglas wall. This could 
happen because the Pavlovian processes are sophisticated and take into account that there is no 
point on deploying a Pavlovian response that cannot succeed, or because in these circumstances 
the response is inhibited by alternative competing processes. Third, the Pavlovian consummatory 
processes are triggered by the presence of very different appetitive items, which is necessary to 
explain why we get similar results for foods and trinkets. 
An important open question for future research is to explore further what makes a stimulus a 
predictive CS capable of triggering a Pavlovian consummatory response, and the extent to which 
appropriate CS are domain specific.  Our limited understanding of the nature of these cues is 
highlighted by the fact that a taste of the food, which one might have speculated should be a 
powerful CS associated with the presence of food, did not activate the approach response. This is 
puzzling since the taste of a food is typically associated with having more of the same food 
available. 
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The results have practical implications in a number of domains. First, consider again the 
problem of restaurateur that has to decide whether to provide its customers with a written menu, 
a picture-based menu, or a dessert tray. The results in this paper suggest that dessert sales should 
go up significantly if the restaurant uses the dessert tray as opposed to the other two options. 
Furthermore, the results of the Plexiglas experiment suggest that a transparent glass dome should 
not cover the desert tray, as is the practice in some establishments. Second, the results also help 
to  explain  companies’  efforts  to  find  the right packaging and display for their products.  
In particular, they suggest that stores might want to display real products to consumers and allow 
more sensory interaction (e.g., test-driving  cars  which  have  the  “new  car  smell”).  Producing  
these effects is especially challenging for Internet commerce since, by necessity, Internet sellers 
are restricted to image, text, and sound displays. Third, the results described above suggest a 
scope for government regulation of packaging and displays of items that are associated with 
unhealthy consumption, such as addictive substances and junk foods, to help consumers self-
regulate (K.J. Wenterbroch, 1998). Finally, our findings might also extend to social bargaining 
situations. A common legal practice is to present a plaintiff with a signed check when making an 
offer for a settlement. Our results suggest that this practice might increase the likelihood that the 
settlement offer is accepted.1  
Our results also provide insight into the findings of two recent studies on the valuation of 
economics  goods.  The  first  one  shows  that  subject’s valuations for small toys (e.g., a slinky) 
                                                 
1 In a sequential trust game, S. Solnick (2007) found that subjects in the second-mover 
trustee role returned only half as much actual cash as other subjects who were asked to return 
play money or make a numerical statement of the intended cash return. Since money is a highly 
conditioned stimulus, the results of this experiment can also be explained through our 
mechanism. Under this explanation, the physical presence of money triggers approach responses 
that makes it hard to transfer it to the other player. 
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increase when they are allowed to touch them (J. Peck and S.B. Shu, forthcoming).  This can be 
explained within our framework by the fact that the touch manipulation involves direct and 
unencumbered proximity to the items, which can trigger Pavlovian approach mechanisms 
towards the desirable items. The second study shows that the occurrence of the classic 
endowment effect (D. Kahneman et al., 1990, J.L. Knetsch and J.A. Sinden, 1984), in which 
subjects valuations for items depend on whether or not they own them, depends on the actual 
items being physically present at the time of the experiment. In fact, a recent study (J.L. Knetsch 
and Wei-Kang Wong, 2009) found no endowment effect when two goods were simply passed 
around and inspected by subjects (but not physically proximate at the time of decision), and a 
strong effect when an endowed good was in front of a subject. Again, this observed difference is 
explained by the Pavlovian consummatory mechanisms described here.  
Our results are related to several other findings about the effects of displays and 
environmental cues on decision-making. Here we describe these findings briefly and discuss 
their similarities and differences with the real-exposure effect and the Pavlovian consummatory 
mechanisms that we think are at work.  
First, a series of experiments have studied the impact of display mode on self-control. (W. 
Mischel and B. Moore, 1973, W. Mischel and B. Underwood, 1974, B. Shiv and A. Fedorikhin, 
1999, K.J. Wenterbroch, 1998) These studies show that subjects are less likely to choose a 
tempting option when it is represented symbolically (e.g., in a picture) than when it is put in front 
of the subjects. Previous interpretations of the experiments have emphasized the tempting nature 
of the goods, but a mechanistic explanation has not been provided. The results in this paper 
suggest that Pavlovian consummatory processes could be at work in these studies, and that this 
might contribute to self-control problems when the tempting good is present. In fact,  choosing 
  
23 
23 
between immediate and delayed rewards sometimes confounds an actual physical display of the 
immediate reward with a symbolic or imagined delayed reward. It follows that some aspects of 
preference for immediacy may be intimately related with the real-exposure effect we document. 
Second, several studies have found that cues associated with being watched by others seem 
to increase pro-sociality in simple economic games. For example, K. Haley and D.M.T. Fessler 
(2005) demonstrated the effect of subtle social cues on the dictator game by using a pair of eyes 
(to cue a sense of being watched) and noise-muffling headphones (to cue a sense of being alone). 
They found that the eyes cue increased giving, but the headphones did not decrease it. M. 
Bateson et al. (2006) found that eye pictures increased voluntary payments for coffee in an 
office. M. Rigdon et al. (2008) demonstrated that three small dots at the top of a piece of paper, 
when oriented in a way that mimics a face, increases giving in a dictator game for males (but not 
for females). T.C. Burnham and B. Hare (2007) found that people give more in a public good 
game in the presence of a robot that was built to appear lifelike. All of these are examples of how 
social cues at the time of decision-making can affect behavior. Although the exact mechanisms 
at work in these results are not known, it might also be the case that they activate highly evolved 
behavioral programs in response to the presence of others (which the brain might detect through 
the perception of real or artificial faces). Note, however, that the types of cues and mechanisms 
at work are different from the real-exposure effect. In our case, the triggering cue is the presence 
of the item itself and the mechanisms at work are Pavlovian consummatory processes that 
activate behaviors that lead to making contact with appetitive items. In contrast, the cue here are 
real or abstract faces and the underlying psychological processes are unknown. 
Third, cues have also been shown to have strong effects in drug cravings and consumption. 
Addicts often experience a craving, and more likely to consume, when cues associated with 
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previous drug use are present. This often leads to relapse even after years of abstinence (see B.D. 
Bernheim and A. Rangel (2004) for a review of the evidence). Although direct exposure to a 
drug of choice is thought to trigger the type of Pavlovian consummatory mechanisms discussed 
in this paper, other drug cues can trigger cravings and recidivism even if the actual drug is not 
present. Such cues include seeing a place or friend associated with drug use, or watching films 
showing the use of drug paraphernalia. This is thought to operate through at least two separate 
mechanisms.  First,  drug  cues  trigger  physiological  “opponent  process”  which  causes  unpleasant  
withdrawal like symptoms (S. Siegel, 1975; D. Laibson, 2001). This is thought to increase the 
marginal utility of consuming the substance. Second, cues are also thought to trigger habitual 
behavioral responses that promote drug seeking behaviors even if utility maximization 
calculations suggest that this is not the optimal course of behavior (B.D. Bernheim and A. 
Rangel, 2004; D. Reddish, 2004; A. Rangel et. al., 2008). 
Finally, cues can also affect behavior through a mechanism known in the behavioral 
economics literature as projection bias (G. Loewenstein et al., 2003). Here, environmental cues 
that change the current experienced utility of consuming an item (e.g., the current level of hunger 
or weather) can affect choices, even if cues (which can also be thought of as states) are not 
predictive of the actual state of the world at the time of consumption. Because such states or cues 
do  not  affect  eventual  consequences,  their  effects  on  choice  violate  the  “consequentialist  view”  
of idealized choice described in the introduction. For example, Gilbert, Gill and Wilson (2002) 
showed that shoppers who were given a muffin to eat before entering a supermarket were more 
likely to restrict their purchases to the items in their shopping list, rather than adding unplanned 
impulse purchases. This finding shows that the value assigned to foods that will not be eaten 
until much later depended on the level of hunger at the time of decision, which is presumably 
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uncorrelated with the hunger state at the time of consumption (see also D. Read and B. van 
Leeuwen, 1998, for a closely related result). M. Conlin et al. (2007) report field evidence for a 
similar effect of weather: unusually cold weather at the time of ordering cold-weather clothes 
from a catalog predicts whether goods are later returned. Note that projection bias is quite 
distinct from the real-exposure effect that we have identified in this paper. In projection bias, 
cues affect behavior because subjects overestimate the extent to which the future experience 
utility of consuming an item will be equal to the experienced utility of consuming it now. Thus, 
it is due to a cognitive bias. In addition, the cues at work have nothing to do with the physical 
presence of the good itself. 
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Figure  1.  Results  for  Experiment  1:  Consumer’s  willingness-to-pay for a food item is larger 
when it is physically present. A) Average bids and standard error bars in the three treatments: 
text, image, and real presentation. There was no significant difference between the text and 
picture conditions, but both were significantly lower than bids in the real condition (p<0.004). B) 
Bids as a function of self-reported liking ratings for each of the treatments. There was no 
statistically significant change in the linear slope of these curves across conditions. 
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Figure  2.  Results  for  Experiment  2:  Consumer’s  willingness-to-pay for a trinket is larger when it 
is physically present. A) Average bids and standard error bars in the three treatments: text, 
image, and real presentation. There was no significant difference between the text and picture 
conditions, but both were significantly lower than bids in the real condition (p<0.008). B) Bids 
as a function of self-reported liking ratings for each of the treatments. There was no statistically 
significant change in the linear slope of these curves across conditions. 
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Figure 3. Results of Experiment 3: A small taste of the food item in the picture condition has no 
impact  on  subject’s  willingness-to-pay. A) A comparison of average bids and standard error bars 
in the picture, taste, and real presentation treatments. There was no significant difference 
between the picture and taste conditions, but the bids in the taste case were lower than in the real 
condition (p<0.029). B) Bids as a function of self-reported liking ratings for each of the 
treatments. There was no statistically significant change in the linear slope of these curves across 
conditions. 
 
A 
B 
  
29 
29 
 
Figure 4. Results of Experiment 4: The introduction of a transparent Plexiglas barrier between 
the subjects and the foods eliminates the difference between the real and picture conditions. A) A 
comparison of average bids and standard error bars in the picture, real with Plexiglas, and real 
without Plexiglas conditions. There was no significant difference between the picture and 
Plexiglas conditions, but the bids in the Plexiglas case were lower than in the real condition 
(p<0.042). B) Bids as a function of self-reported liking ratings for each of the treatments. There 
was no statistically significant change in the linear slope of these curves across conditions. 
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Abstract. People’s  pleasant  and  aversive experiences are accompanied by hedonic responses, 
also called experienced utility (EU). A basic and open question is the extent to which the EU 
signals encoded by the brain depend only on what is consumed, or also on the extent to which 
the experienced level of pleasure was better or worse than anticipated. In particular, economic 
and psychological theories suggest that good news increases hedonic responses and bad news 
decreases them. We investigated this question using a human fMRI experiment in which thirsty 
subjects consumed liquid rewards that were anticipated and liked to various degrees. We found 
that areas of the orbitofrontal cortex that are known to correlate with subjective pleasure were 
modulated both by the direct pleasure from consumption and by the extent to which that outcome 
was a surprise. We also found that subjects were more likely to later choose stimuli (fractal 
images) that were previously associated with positive surprises, and avoid those associated with 
negative surprises, which provides further support that good news is pleasurable and bad news is 
aversive. 
 
 
  
36 
36 
Classical  models  in  economics  and  psychology  assume  that  a  person’s  hedonic  response  depends  
only on the identity of what is consumed (e.g., water versus juice), and the individual’s  
physiological state at the time of consumption (e.g., thirsty versus satiated) (7). In contrast, other 
models assume that the hedonic response also depends on the degree to which the consumption 
event was anticipated: consumption of a liked item is more pleasurable when unanticipated, and 
consumption of a disliked item is more aversive when unanticipated (8–11). By the same token, 
a given level of consumption is more pleasurable when unexpected. This surprise component of 
subjective well-being can be stated simply: good news is pleasurable and bad news is unpleasant. 
There is a growing consensus that the surprise component of experienced utility (EU) is an 
important  force  in  people’s  choices  and  is  necessary  to  understand  risk  preferences  and  other  
important economic phenomena.  
Yet the focus in neuroscience has been on consumption as the sole carrier of value. In this 
paper, we present a pair of experiments that together suggest that both consumption and surprise 
about consumption are hedonic components. Experiment 1 shows that activity in the OFC is 
determined simultaneously by both the amount of juice subjects consumed and their surprise in 
the amount they consumed. With treatments where subjects received different levels of juice but 
fully expected what they received, we show that the OFC signal encodes consumption 
independent from the surprise component. With treatments where subjects received the same 
juice amount but did so with varying degrees of surprise, we show that the OFC signal also 
encodes the surprise component independent from the consumption component.  Experiment 2 
suggests that these OFC signals are encoding hedonic value. We associated fractal images with 
surprise and non-surprise juice rewards and found that the value induced in a later choice task 
over those fractals reflected both the pure consumption value of the juice and the surprise value.  
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Our results are intrinsically inconclusive and tentative in ways we return to in the discussion 
and the end of the paper. But taken together these experiments strongly suggest a re-orientation 
in focus and interpretation in neural studies and an avenue for future research to put greater 
emphasis  on  the  comparable  “value”  nature  of  consumption  and  news.  Within  an  experimental  
session, consumption of juice and the surprise over that consumption independently induced the 
same sort of activity in OFC commonly associated with value, and do so in a way that matched 
the two components emphasized in behaviorally and psychologically motivated models of utility 
from economic and psychological research, and induced the same sort of value in an associated 
stimulus.  
 
 
I. EXPERIMENT 1: FMRI TASK 
 
The first experiment, summarized in Fig. 1A (see SOM for details), used human fMRI to study 
the EU responses in areas of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) that have been previously shown to 
correlate with subjectively experienced pleasure (12–19). Thirsty participants were given small 
amounts of two types of liquid rewards inside the scanner: a highly liked juice (mean 
pleasantness rating=3.50, SD=0.508, scale -4 to 4) and a neutral control solution (mean rating=-
0.406, SD=0.712; p<.0001 one-sided paired t-test). We varied parametrically the extent to which 
the two possible outcomes were expected: a cue at the beginning of every trial indicated the 
probability p of obtaining the juice (p = 1, 2/3, 1/3, 0). The neutral solution was delivered with 
probability 1-p. Fig. 1B-C describe the basic idea of the experiment. If the EU signals encoded in 
OFC depend only on what is consumed, then they should respond to what is consumed, but not 
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to the extent to which it is a surprise (i.e., they should be independent of p; Fig. 1B). In contrast, 
if the EU signals encoded in OFC depend also on expectations, then their response should 
depend both on what is consumed, and on the extent to which that consumption event was 
anticipated (i.e., they should be dependent on both outcome and p, as shown in Fig. 1C).  
In order to evaluate these predictions we analyzed the BOLD data in several steps. First, we 
estimated a simple general linear model of BOLD activity at the time of consumption to identify 
regions of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) that were more responsive to the more liked juice than 
to the less liked neutral liquid (see SOM for details). Since both models predict that activity in an 
area responsive to EU should be stronger for the juice than for the neutral liquid, this provides a 
localizer for areas that respond in a manner consistent with EU coding, without biasing responses 
in favor of either model. We found an area of medial OFC in which responses were stronger 
during the consumption of the juice (Fig. 2A, Table S1). This result is consistent with a growing 
number of previous studies that have shown that activity in this area of OFC correlates positively 
with measures of EU for a wide class of stimuli using fMRI (12–19) and PET (20, 21). 
Furthermore, devaluation paradigms show that the OFC response when consuming a stimulus is 
lower after subjects are fed to satiation (12, 13, 22–24).  
Second, we carried out a region-of-interest analysis of the individual responses in this area of 
OFC to determine if they responded only to the type of liquid received, or also to the degree of 
surprise. We did this by estimating a mixed effects linear regression of how the individual 
responses in OFC for each of the six possible experimental outcomes were modulated by two 
variables: an indicator variable for receiving the more liked juice, and a variable measure the 
extent to which the experienced pleasure exceeded or fell below expectations for the trial (see 
SOM for exact definitions). We found that the response in OFC was significantly affected by 
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both (p<.023 for outcome regressor; p<.056 for surprise regressor), which is consistent with the 
existence of a surprise component of EU. As described in the SOMs, this regression model also 
allowed us to estimate the relative weight given to the direct and surprise components of the EU 
signal in the OFC responses. We also found that the effect of the surprise component on the OFC 
responses was four times stronger than the direct component (coefficients: 0.795 vs. 0.215, 
p<0.003). 
Third, we carried out a Bayesian model comparison (25) of the extent to which the following 
two models accounted for responses in the area of OFC identified in Fig. 2A. The first model 
assumed that activity at consumption was modulated only by the direct component of EU, while 
the second model assumed that it was modulated by both (with relative weights equal to those 
estimated in the previous ROI). We found that the model with both components had an 
exceedance probability of  > 99.2% over the model that only included direct components. 
Fourth, we carried out an additional region-of-interest analysis of the responses in OFC to 
investigate if positive and negative surprises had symmetric effects. We did this by estimating a 
new mixed effects linear model of the individual OFC responses with three independent 
variables: 1) the direct components of EU for each trial, 2) the surprise component of EU 
interacted with a dummy variable for positive surprise trials, and 3) the surprise component of 
EU interacted with a dummy variable for negative surprise trials. We found that the effect of the 
negative surprise measure was not significantly different from the effect of the positive surprise 
measure.  
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II. EXPERIMENT 2: CONDITIONING TASK 
 
Although the results from the first experiment are consistent with the surprise model of EU, they 
are not sufficient to establish that the effect of surprises have an effect on experienced hedonics. 
Armed with only the neural data we cannot rule out the possibility that only the non-surprise 
component of the EU actually affects the hedonic experience (perhaps because this area contains 
a mixture of neurons encoding separately for hedonics and degree of surprise). The surprise 
component of the EU signal is mathematically identical with a (cognitive) prediction-error signal 
that has been found to play a critical role in reinforcement learning, and which is distinct from a 
hedonic response (2, 3, 26–29). As a result, without further evidence we cannot rule out that the 
OFC might contain a combination of surprise-independent EU and non-hedonic prediction-error 
signals.  
We addressed both concerns with a second behavioral conditioning task that is closely 
related to the first experiment. As before, subjects received either the juice or a neutral solution 
after being exposed to a cue indicating the probability of receiving each of the two liquids. There 
were three key differences with the first experiment. First, there were only three lottery 
conditions (p=1,1/2,0), which leads to the four outcomes depicted in Fig. 3A. Second, at the time 
the liquid was revealed, subjects were exposed to one of four fractal stimuli. Importantly, for 
each subject the same fractal was always paired with the same outcome condition. Third, after 60 
rounds of this conditioning task, subjects were asked to make two choices. Both decisions 
involved a choice between two pairs of equal probability lotteries between two fractals, which 
are depicted in Fig. 3B. Afterwards, we randomly selected one of the fractals from the chosen 
  
41 
41 
pairs, and participants received the outcome (juice or neutral liquid) that was associated with 
those fractals.  
The first choice allowed us to examine if the hedonic response was modulated by the type of 
outcome: the first lottery gave 50% probability to the fractals associated with the juice outcome, 
whereas the second lottery gave 50% probability to the fractals associated with the neutral liquid 
outcome. Note that in As a result, if the EU signal increases with the type of outcome, 
individuals should choose the first lottery over the second one. This is what we found: 27 out of 
30 participants (p<.00001, binomial test) chose the lotteries associated with the juice outcome. 
The second choice allowed us to examine if the hedonic response was modulated by surprise: 
the first lottery gave 50% probability to the fractal associated with the surprise appetitive 
outcome and 50% he fractal associated with the fully expected neutral liquid; the second lottery 
gave 50% to the fractals associated the fully expected appetitive outcome and 50% to the fractal 
associated with surprise neutral liquid. Note that since the value acquired by the fractals is equal 
to the hedonic response of the outcome to which they are paired, if there is a surprise signal the 
individuals should choose the first lottery over the second one. This is what we found: 23 out of 
30  (p<.003, binomial test) chose the first lottery over the second one.  
The specific design we employed allowed us to conclude that second experimental results of 
the conditioning experiment can only be explained if there are surprised-related hedonics. To 
support this claim, we ran a standard reinforcement learning (RL) analysis of our experiment 
under the assumption that there are no surprise-related hedonics, and found that this generated 
predictions inconsistent with the choice experiment (see Methods). We then employed a standard 
RL analysis of our experiment under the assumption that there are surprise-related hedonics, and 
show that this generates predictions consistent with the choice experiment. 
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Together, the results of the two experiments allow us to draw several conclusions. First, there 
is strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the EU signal encoded in OFC is modulated 
both by the direct pleasure derived from consumption, and by the extent to which the level of 
pleasure obtained exceeds or falls short of expectations. Second, a neurometric estimate suggests 
that the surprise component might be stronger than the direct component of EU. Third, we found 
that negative and positive surprises have a similar impact in OFC. Finally, we found that the 
surprise component of EU affects the value that is learned for stimuli through affective 
conditioning.  
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Several previous studies have addressed related questions, but their results could not establish if 
the EU signals in OFC are responsive to the extent to which the pleasure at consumption exceeds 
or fall behind expectations. Some studies have tried to measure the impact of expectations on EU 
directly by manipulating the expectation of obtaining a monetary reward and then measuring EU 
using subjective reports (11, 30). Their results have been consistent with the surprise model, but 
did not address how EU modulated brain activity. Second, several neurophysiology (31, 32) and 
fMRI (33, 34) studies have found responses in orbitofrontal cortex at the time of consumption 
that were also consistent with the surprise model of EU. Unfortunately, their results were 
inconclusive because they could not rule out that this area was encoding prediction errors instead 
of reference-dependent EU (and in fact, they have generally been interpreted as prediction 
errors). This study suggests that such signals are inconsistent with non-hedonic prediction-error 
signals and are better explained as surprise-related hedonics.   
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The fact that the surprise component of EU was passed to the fractals in the conditioning task 
is important because it demonstrates that the value that subjects learn to assign to a stimulus 
depend on the predictability of their outcomes during learning. Some psychology studies have 
argued that individuals who make choices assuming that their preferences have a surprise 
component are making a mistake (35). The results presented here argue against that 
interpretation of the data—if, in fact, good news leads to a pleasurable experience, then it is 
perfectly reasonable for individuals to seek out such pleasure.  
The consumption and surprise components of utility might be computed in distinct areas 
before they are integrated into a net hedonic signal. A natural hypothesis is that the surprise 
component is based on a prediction-error signal computed by dopamine release into the striatum. 
This signal might then be passed to many other areas, including the OFC areas involved in 
encoding total hedonics. However, it must also be the case that these components are integrated 
somewhere into a hedonic signal so that it can perform all of its roles. The only such signal that 
we found (at our omnibus threshold) is in the OFC. 
These results have significant implications in various domains. First, economic and 
psychological theories based on the surprise models of EU have distinctive normative and policy 
implications (9, 36, 37). The results of this paper provide support for these types of models and 
their implications. Second, our results suggest that the simple type of value learning models that 
have been used in neuroscience and psychology, such as reinforcement learning (1, 38), which 
ignore the surprise components of EU, are likely to mispredict the values learned by subjects in a 
large class of situations. Third, the results provide neural foundations for the fact that 
expectations can affect subjective well-being so that, for example, a fully anticipated increase in 
consumption could have a smaller impact on EU than one might otherwise expect (39). 
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Figure 1. Basic experiment and model predictions. A) Timeline for a typical trial of the fMRI 
task. Participants were shown a cue describing a lottery between receiving an appetitive juice 
(with probability p) and a neutral solution (with probability 1-p). at the end of the trial. After a 
short 1–6 s random delay, one of the liquids was delivered and participants held the liquid in 
their mouth for 6s until they were instructed to swallow it. B) Predicted consEU signals for each 
condition. C) Predicted totalEU for each condition, for the case in which totalEU = 0.5 consEU 
+ 0.5 newsEU. 
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Figure 2. Experiment 1 results. A) Area of mOFC that responded more strongly to the highly 
liked juice than to the neutral liquid at the time of consumption (shown at p<.001 uncorrected 
with a 10 voxel extent threshold; overlaid on average anatomical image).  B) Mean brain 
response in the mOFC region of interest as a function of the experimental condition.  
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Figure 3. Experiment 2 design and results. A) Training phase of the conditioning experiment. 
Four fractals were used, and each fractal was always paired with the same experimental 
condition. The assignment of fractals to conditions was randomized across subjects. B) 
Description of choices presented to the subjects after the training phase.  
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Table 1.  GLM 1. Areas in which BOLD responses are higher for the juice than the neutral liquid at the 
time of swallowing. 
 
Region Side BA MNI Coordinates (peak voxels) Z 
 
Pre/Postcentral Gyrus 
L 
R 
2,4,6 
 
-57, -15, 39 
66, -18, 36 
4.96 
4.30 
 
Parietal  
L 
R 
7 -18, -60, 66 
21, -66, 69 
4.85 
4.63 
 
Middle temporal 
L 
R 
19,39 -56, -66, 6 
60, -63, 9 
4.50 
4.54 
 
Orbitofrontal Cortex 
R 10 15, 57, -9 4.32 
Results thresholded at p<.05, whole-brain cluster correction (t = 4.2155) 
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Appendix 1.  
METHODS 
 
I. THEORY 
In this study we compare two popular models of experienced utility (EU). In order to describe 
the models we need some notation. Let U denote the EU signal at the time of consumption; 
x=J,N denote the liquid consumed (juice or neutral liquid); and p=1,2/3,1/3,0 denote the 
probability of receiving the juice for that consumption event. 
 
Model 1: Standard experienced-utility (SEU) model.  
This model assumes that the EU signal depends only on the amount of reward generated by the 
liquid consumed. Thus, it predicts that U(J|p) = U(J|p’)  =  u(J) > U(N|p) = U(N|p’)  =  u(N) for all 
p and p’, where u(x) is a function measuring the direct pleasure derived directly from consuming 
x, independent of expectations. Fig. 1B describes the predictions of this model for our 
experiment for the case in which u(J) = 1 and u(N) = 0. In order to facilitate the discussion 
below, we refer to u(x) as the direct component of EU. 
 
Model 2: Reference-dependent experienced-utility (RDEU) models.  
This class of models, which have been proposed by Koszegi and Rabin (9,36–37), Loomes and 
Sugden (10), and Bell (8) and others, assumes that the EU signal is given by 
U(x|p) = (1-a)*u(x)+ a* (u(x)-E[u(x)|p]), 
where a is a weighting factor representing the relative contribution of the two components, E is 
the expectation operator, and a is restricted to be between 0 and 1.  
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The predictions of this model are depicted in Fig. 1C for the case of a=3/4, u(J) = 1, and 
u(N)  =  0.  We  refer  to  the  term  “u(x)- E[u(x)|p]”  as  the  surprise  component  of  the  model,  which  
measures how much of the basic reward received was unexpected. Note that this model assumes 
that EU is a linear combination of the direct and surprise components of consumption, and that 
the surprise term can be either positive or negative, depending on whether the actual level of 
direct consumption is above or below the amount that was expected. 
This simple version of the model assumes that EU is a linear combination of the direct and 
surprise components. More general versions of the theory relax this assumption. 
The regressors used in the parametric fMRI analyses are derived from the two models 
described here. The direct component of EU is given by u(J)=1 or u(N)=0, depending on which 
item was consumed. The surprise component of EU is given by u(x)-E[u(x)|p], and it also 
assumes that u(J)=1 and u(N)=0. The normalization of the direct component of EU is without 
loss of generality because it does not affect any of the statistical contrasts used in the analysis. 
 
II. METHODS FOR EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Subjects. Thirty-four  subjects  recruited  from  Caltech’s  student  body  participated  in  the  
experiment (38% female; mean age=21.7; age range 18–27). However, we dropped data from 
two subjects, as they did not meet an a priori excessive movement exclusion criterion during the 
scanning sessions. All subjects were right-handed, healthy, had normal to corrected-normal 
vision, and were not taking any medications that would interfere with the performance of fMRI. 
No subjects reporting having any food or beverage allergies. The review board of Caltech 
approved the study and subjects provided informed consent prior to their participation. 
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Task. Subjects abstained from drinking any liquids for 4 hours prior to the experiment. Upon 
their arrival, they tasted a very small amount (< 5 ml) of 14 liquids and rated the subjective 
pleasantness of each. The scale for the ratings task began with -4 = strong dislike, through 0 = 
neutral, to +4 = strong like. All liquids were sweet, zero pulp, and served at room temperature. 
For all subjects, the highest-rated juice was used in the scanning portion as the liked juice. The 
neutral liquid was always a neutral control solution made with water and the ionic components of 
saliva. 
Once inside the scanner, participants received juice directly into their mouths from tubes. 
The timeline of events can be seen in Fig. 1A. Subjects were shown four different lotteries which 
differed on the probability p=1,2/3,1/3/,0 with which the juice was delivered. The neutral 
solution was delivered with probability 1-p. Each lottery was depicted by a pie chart indicating 
the probability of the two outcomes. In order to insure a sufficient number of trials for each type 
of outcome the frequency of trials was given by the following: 
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Table 2. Frequency of delivery by experiment condition, Experiment 1. 
P Frequency 
1 1/6 
2/3 1/3 
1/3 1/3 
0 1/6 
 
Subjects were explained the meaning of the lottery cues prior to scanning and were given a short 
quiz to insure that they understood. Subjects were asked to hold the liquid in their mouth for 6 s 
until they were cued to swallow it. Inter-trial intervals were pseudo-randomized between 1 and 9 
seconds. 
There were three runs of the task, each lasting 12 minutes 28 seconds. Each run consisted of 
40 trials of the task. In order to minimize satiation effects, we limited the juice intake to ~ 60 
milliliters over the course of the experiment (.5 ml per trial). 
 
fMRI Acquisition. The fMRI data was acquired in a Siemens Trio 3.0 Tesla machine with an 
eight-channel phased array coil at the Caltech Brain Imaging Center. We acquired gradient echo 
T2*-weighted echoplanar (EPI) images with BOLD contrast. We also acquired T1-weighted 
structural images (1 mm cubic volumes) for anatomical localization. We acquired the BOLD 
data using an orientation of 30 degrees with respect to the line of anterior commissure-posterior 
commissure (ACPC), which has been shown to improve signal-to-noise ratio in OFC (6). 
Functional scanning parameters were as follows: echo time, 30 ms; field of view, 192 mm; in- 
plane resolution and slice thickness, 3 mm; repetition time, 2.75 s; flip angle, 80 degrees. 
 
fMRI Preprocessing. We performed all image analyses using SPM5 (Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). We corrected images for slice 
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acquisition time within each volume, motion corrected the images with realignment based on the 
first volume, and spatially normalized the final product to the Montreal Neurological Institute 
EPI template. Finally, we spatially smoothed images using a Gaussian kernel with width 8 mm. 
We also applied intensity normalization and high-pass filtering with filter width of 128 s. We 
excluded data from two subjects who consistently moved in excess of 3 mm. 
 
General Linear Model 1. The first step in the analysis of fMRI data involved estimating a model 
designed to identify brain regions that responded more strongly to the consumption of the juice 
than to the consumption of the neutral liquid. This first analysis is important because both 
theories predict that an area that encodes EU should exhibit a stronger hedonic response to the 
juice, which means that it provides a localizer for regions involved in computing the EU signal 
without biasing it towards either of the two models. This GLM was estimated in three steps. 
First, for each individual we estimated a GLM with first order autoregression and the 
following three regressors: (R1) at lottery cue, and (R2) at swallowing juice, and (R3) at 
swallowing neutral liquid. R1 was parametrically modulated by p. R2 and R3 were unmodulated. 
R1 was modeled as an event with a 0 s duration aligned to the appearance of the lottery cue. R2 
and R3 were modeled as an event with a 2 s duration aligned to the appearance of the swallowing 
instruction. All of these regressors were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response 
function. The model also included session constants and motion parameters as regressors of no 
interest. 
Second, we calculated the contrast R2 > R3 for every subject using a one-tailed t-test. 
Third, we estimated a second-level mixed effects analysis over all of the subjects by 
computing one-sample t-tests on the single-subject contrast coefficients. The results are shown in 
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Table S1 and Fig. 2A. For visualization purposes only, all of the images shown in the paper and 
supplementary materials are thresholded at p < .001 uncorrected with an extent threshold of five 
voxels. For inference purposes, we use whole-brain corrections at the cluster level based on the 
algorithm implemented in the CorrClusTh program by Thomas Nichols 
(http://www.sph.umich.edu/~nichols/JG5/CorrClusTh.m). All anatomical localizations were 
performed by overlapping the t-maps on a normalized structural image averaged across subjects, 
and with reference to an anatomical atlas (7). 
  
About GLM 1. GLM 1 assumes that the EU response takes place at the time of swallowing, but 
not during the 6 seconds tasting period that takes place between the delivery of the liquids and 
the swallowing instruction. Since previous studies have found hedonic responses at the time of 
tasting (8–10), it is important to justify this modeling assumption. 
Note that, depending on how exactly the liquids are tasted and swallowed, a priori they can 
generate hedonic responses at tasting, at swallowing, or both. We did not have any a priori 
hypothesis on when within these two intervals will we observe the strongest EU like responses. 
As a result, we carried out the following model comparison to determine that GLM 1 best 
describe the hedonic responses. This was done in two steps. 
First, in addition  to  GLM  1,  we  estimated  an  additional  model  GLM  1’  in  which  hedonic  
responses were only modeled at the time of tasting (with a duration of 6 s). We then carried out a 
contrast analogous to the one for GLM 1 to identify areas that responded more strongly to the 
juice than to the liquid neutral at the time of tasting at our omnibus threshold of p<0.05 whole-
brain corrected. We did not find any such areas. 
Second,  we  estimated  two  additional  models:  a  GLM  1’’,  which  was  identical  to  GLM  1  
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except that it restricted  the  response  to  both  liquids  at  swallowing  to  be  identical,  and  a  GLM  1’’’  
that included regressors at tasting (with 6 second duration) and at swallowing (with 2 second 
duration), separately for the juice and neutral liquid outcomes. Note that the three models are 
nested,  with  GLM  1’’  being  a  special  case  of  GLM  1,  and  GLM  1  being  a  special  case  of  GLM  
1’’’.  As  a  result,  it  is  possible  to  compare  the  models  using  standard  F-tests , which weigh the 
relative increase in fit to the increase in degrees of freedom. 
First, we  compared  models  GLM  1’’  and  GLM  1  using  a  simple  F-test. For each individual, 
we averaged the F-statistics over the area of orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) identified in GLM 1 (Fig. 
2A, Table S1). We found that in 31 out of 32 subjects we could reject the hypothesis at p<0.05 
that the responses at swallow for juice and the neutral liquid were identical when comparing 
GLM  1’’  and  GLM  1.  We  also  found  that  in  31  out  of  32  subjects  we  could  not  reject  the  
hypothesis that the coefficients for the regressors at tasting were equal to zero within our ROI at 
p<0.05.  This  is  the  key  test  when  comparing  GLM  1  and  GLM  1’’’. 
Together, these results provide supporting evidence for the fact that in our experiment the 
responses of the OFC were consistent with the encoding of an EU signal at swallowing, but not 
at taste. 
It is also important to emphasize that all of the analyses described so far are used to identify 
the area of OFC that responds in a manner consistent with EU encoding in our sample, but that 
these analyses are independent of the next set of tests designed to test between the SEU and 
RDEU models. 
 
ROI definition and signal extraction. Based on the results of GLM 1 we defined a mask of OFC 
given by the intersection of the group contrast described above (thresholded at p<.001 unc., five 
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voxel extent threshold) and an anatomical mask of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). 
The resulting mask is shown in Fig. 2. 
We then constructed individual measures of the response in this area of OFC for each of the 
six possible experimental outcomes: (x=N, p=2/3), (x=N, p=1/3), (x=N, p=0), (x=J, p=1), (x=J, 
p=1/3), (x=N, p=2/3). To do this we had to estimate a new GLM 2, which is similar to GLM 1 
except that now each of the six outcomes is modeled as a separate event. 
In order to insure the independence of the individual response measures from the ROI 
analyses, the response was constructed as follows for each target subject. First, we identified the 
region of ROI that responds more strongly for juice than neutral liquid at consumption by 
running the second leaving contrast excluding the target subject. Second, we computed the 
average response (beta value) for each subject and condition in this mask. 
 
ROI analysis 1. We investigated the shape of the EU signals in OFC by estimating a random  
effects linear regression of its responses. The dependent variable was the extracted response in 
OFC activity for each subject and outcome condition. The independent variables for were the 
direct and the surprise components of EU for each trial, which were constructed as described in 
the theory section above. Let bDEU and bRDEU denote the estimated coefficients of both 
variables. Note that bRDEU / (bDEU + bRDEU) provides an unbiased estimate of a. For later 
references, the estimated value was a= 0.795. 
 
ROI analysis 2. We estimated a second ROI model to investigate if the correlation between the 
surprise component of EU and OFC activity depended on the sign of the surprise. The model was 
almost identical to ROI 1 except that now there were three independent variables: 1) the direct 
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components of EU for each trial, 2) the surprise component of EU interacted with a dummy 
variable for positive surprise trials, and 3) the surprise component of EU interacted with a 
dummy variable for negative surprise trials. 
 
Bayesian model comparison. Finally, we used a Bayesian model comparison procedure (12) to 
compare which of the two candidate models fit the BOLD responses in OFC better. The first 
model was GLM 1, which is the case of SEU. The second model, GLM 2, was identical except 
that activity at swallowing was modulated by the predictions of the RDEU model, using a value 
a = 0.8, u(J)=1, and u(N)=0 (which was taken from the results of ROI 1). 
Briefly, we used the Bayesian comparison methods to test which of the two models fit best 
the log evidences for BOLD responses within a 12 mm sphere (1.5x smoothing kernel size) 
centered on the OFC group peak for GLM 1. Note that this procedure treats the model as a 
random variable and estimating the parameters of a Dirichlet distribution, which describes the 
probabilities for all models considered. These probabilities then define a multinominal 
distribution over model space, allowing one to compute how likely it is that a model generated 
the  subjects’  data.  To  decide  which  model  is  more  likely,  we  use  the  conditional  model  
probabilities to quantify an exceedance probability, i.e., a belief that a particular model is more 
likely than the other model, given the group data. 
 
III. METHODS FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
Task. As in Experiment 1, subjects abstained from drinking any liquids for 4 hours prior to the 
experiment. Upon their arrival, they tasted a very small amount (< 5 ml) of 14 liquids and rated 
the subjective pleasantness of each. The scale for the ratings task began with -4 = strong dislike, 
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through 0 = neutral, to +4 = strong like. All liquids were sweet, zero pulp, and served at room 
temperature. For all subjects, the highest-rated juice was used in the conditioning portion as the 
liked juice. The neutral liquid was always a neutral control solution made with water and the 
ionic components of saliva. 
Next, participants received juice directly into their mouths from tubes while seated at a table 
with a keyboard. Subjects were shown four different lotteries which differed on the probability 
p=1,1/2,1 which indicated the probability that the juice would be delivered. The neutral solution 
was delivered with probability 1-p. Each lottery was depicted by a pie chart indicating the 
probability of the two outcomes.  
Each lottery was paired with a fractal which was shown at the delivery stage (the 
“conditioned  fractal”;;  see  Table  3  below).  Fractals  were  generated  from  the  Mandelbrot  set from 
an online archive—the exact fractals used for particular subjects was randomized. During the 
conditioning stage, the subject passively viewed the lotteries and fractals and drank the juice. 
There was no choice task. Conditioning lasted for ~ 60 rounds.  
 
Table 3. Frequency of delivery by experiment condition, Experiment 2. 
P Outcome Fractal shown 
1 Juice 1 
½  Juice 2 
½ Neutral 3 
0 Neutral 4 
 
After the conditioning task, subjects were asked to choose between two lotteries over 
fractals—the outcome of the lottery (determined by a coin flip) would determine a final sip of 
either juice or neutral solution. Subjects received the outcome depending on their choice, were 
paid and left. 
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Abstract. What are the computational and neurobiological mechanisms that support altruistic 
behavior? We used fMRI to investigate the neural mechanisms underlying two distinct 
motivations for altruism: 1) normative preferences, in which individuals care about appearing 
ethical to themselves or others, and 2) direct preferences, where individuals care about their own 
and  others’  outcomes.  We  found  that  the  motives  are  supported  by  dissociable  neural  processes.  
The dlPFC supports normative preferences both by suppressing the influence of valuation 
regions like the vmPFC and by directly influencing response selection. In contrast, the 
temporoparietal junction and anterior cingulate cortex support direct preferences by computing a 
value  that  includes  others’  outcomes.  In addition, we found that the strength with which the two 
processes are deployed is negatively correlated across individuals (with normative preferences 
driving generosity only when direct preferences are relatively weak) and are associated with 
different levels of generosity. 
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Altruism, as defined here, involves helping others at a material cost to the self, and is distinct 
from other types of pro-social behavior supported by strategic considerations1–3. Altruism is an 
apparently universal feature of human societies4, and understanding the motives and processes 
that support it has been a major goal in economics, psychology, philosophy, and neuroscience. A 
large number of models have been proposed for why individuals engage in altruistic behavior, 
ranging from inequality aversion5 and social efficiency concerns6,7 to social signaling1 or internal 
guilt8. Although different in their precise formulations, these theories can be classified into two 
broad categories: people behave generously because 1) they have normative preferences to 
comply with their beliefs about the social and ethical norms that dictate appropriate actions9–12, 
or 2) they have direct preferences over the distributions of outcomes between themselves and 
others5,6,13,14. An individual motivated by normative preferences behaves altruistically because he 
derives value from the appearance of his actions, either to himself or observers, independent of 
the ultimate effects of those actions.  In contrast, an individual with direct preferences 
(sometimes referred to as distributive preferences) behaves altruistically because he derives 
value from  others’  outcomes as well as his own. To illustrate the distinction, consider someone 
confronted by a beggar. Normative preferences might dictate giving money to the beggar when 
looking the other way seems too morally callous, regardless of the impact of his choice on the 
beggar. In contrast, direct preferences might dictate giving regardless of appearances, because of 
value  derived  directly  from  improving  the  beggar’s  well-being.  
Determining the relative role of these two motives in different domains may be important for 
the design of institutions and policies that promote social welfare and pro-social behavior. Yet 
this goal has proven difficult to achieve using purely behavioral methods, because both 
mechanisms may be at work within or across individuals and often produce similar behavior6. 
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For example, as predicted by normative preference mechanisms, decreasing the saliency of social 
norms  (by  priming  anonymity,  obscuring  the  effect  of  one’s  choices,  or  changing  implicit  
experimental demands9,12,15) decreases—but does not entirely eradicate—generosity. Yet it is 
difficult to determine whether the remaining altruism results from direct preferences, or from 
incomplete crowding out of normative preferences.  
To supplement continued efforts with behavioral and other approaches, some researchers 
have turned to neuroscience to gain better insight into underlying neural mechanisms of altruism.  
This research shows that regions related to thinking about others, like the temporoparietal 
junction (TPJ)16, as well as reward-related regions like the ventral striatum (vStr) and medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC)17,18, are active during decisions that reflect an altruistic concern for 
either charities17–19 or other individuals20,21. These results have generally been interpreted as 
support for the existence of direct preferences in altruistic decision-making. But the value of the 
choice to help others also correlates with the normative value of behaving generously. 
Unfortunately, none of these studies was designed to test this, which means that these reward 
signals could be associated with either process. 
Other work has examined the neural bases of normative mechanisms during reciprocal 
interactions involving cooperation and punishment. These studies suggest that the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) is involved in suppressing self-interested behavior8,22–24 in this class of 
social decisions. It is tempting to interpret this as evidence that dlPFC supports the 
implementation of normative preferences, since there is a well-established link between dlPFC 
and behavioral inhibition (preventing prepotent or automatic processes from controlling 
actions25,26). Under this interpretation, the dlPFC supports behavior consistent with normative 
preferences through behavioral control that prevents the expression of selfish impulses22. 
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However, recent research on self-control in non-social domains suggests an alternative 
computational role for the dlPFC in these tasks that is also consistent with implementing direct 
preferences. More concretely, the dlPFC appears to also affect behavior by modulating value 
signals in vmPFC 27,28. This modulation could be consistent with implementing either normative 
preferences (if it increases the sensitivity of the vmPFC to normative concerns) or direct 
preferences  (if  it  increases  the  sensitivity  of  the  vmPFC  to  others’  outcomes).  Since  no  studies  
have examined the precise mechanism via which dlPFC promotes altruism, it is unclear whether 
its activation reflects normative preferences, direct preferences, or both. 
Thus, while the existing literature provides important hints as to some of the regions involved 
in supporting altruistic behavior, it leaves unanswered several critical questions. 1) Are 
computations in areas such as mPFC, vStr, and dlPFC associated with implementing normative 
preferences, direct preferences, or both? 2) How much do individuals use these two neural 
mechanisms, and how do they interact within individuals? 3) What is the association between the 
two mechanisms and the tendency to make generous choices? 
To answer these questions, we used human functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). 
Several key experimental features allowed us to independently measure value computations 
related to generous actions and generous outcomes, and thus to dissociate the neural mechanisms 
that support normative and direct preferences. To measure value computations related to 
generous actions, fifty-one participants made 180 real decisions between a proposed pair of 
payments to themselves and an anonymous partner or a constant default payment-pair of $50 to 
both subjects (Fig. 1A, see Online Methods for details). The proposed payments to each person 
in the payment-pair varied from $10 to $100 (Fig. 1B). All payment-pairs included one payment 
below and one payment above the default, and thus always involved a choice between generous 
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behavior  (benefitting  one’s  partner  at  a  cost  to  oneself)  and  selfish  behavior  (benefitting oneself 
at  a  cost  to  one’s  partner).  Subjects  indicated  their  choice  using  a  4-point scale (Strong No, No, 
Yes, Strong Yes), which allowed us to measure both their decision and the value they assigned to 
the proposed payment at the time of choice. To measure computations related to generous 
outcomes, each trial also included a probabilistic outcome period: in 60% of trials the participant 
received his chosen option, while in 40% of trials his choice was vetoed and he received the 
alternative, non-chosen option.  This probabilistic outcome appeared at the end of each trial; one 
trial was picked randomly at the end of scanning to determine payoffs for both participants. The 
partner, who knew that 40% of choices were vetoed, saw only the final outcome. 
Critically, this experimental design allowed us to distinguish neural mechanisms 
implementing normative preferences from those implementing direct preferences, as well as to 
measure the extent to which each individual relies on the two motives.  Our results suggest that 
the dlPFC supports normative preferences, both by suppressing the influence of valuation 
regions like the vmPFC and by directly influencing response selection; and that the 
temporoparietal junction and anterior cingulate cortex support direct preferences, by integrating 
the  value  of  others’  outcomes  into  the  decision  process.    Moreover,  the  deployment  of  these  two  
mechanisms is negatively correlated across individuals (i.e., normative mechanisms drive 
generosity only when direct mechanisms are relatively weak), and is associated with different 
levels of anonymous giving. 
 
 
  
  
69 
69 
I. EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS 
 
A. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN GENEROSITY 
 
On average, subjects made generous choices—maximizing  their  partner’s  payoff  ($Partner)  at  a  
cost to their own ($Self)—in 21% of trials, sacrificing $3.73 from a mean possible payoff of 
$27.75 per trial in order to give $8.31 to their partner. While this amount is fairly low, there was 
considerable individual variation: 0%-61% generous choices, $0-$17.08 sacrificed per trial, and 
$0-$22.37 donated to the partner.  
The distribution of money sacrificed (Fig. 1C) suggested that our subjects may have been 
drawn from two distinct distributions: a large group who acted comparatively selfishly, and a 
second, smaller group who acted more generously. We carried out a formal test of this possibility 
(see Online Methods for details) by using Markov-chain Monte Carlo methods to estimate the 
mean and standard deviation of the two separate distributions as well as the probability that 
subjects were drawn from each distribution. We then compared the likelihood of this model to 
one in which generosity levels were drawn from a single population. A likelihood ratio test 
indicated that the mixture model fit the data considerably better than the single distribution 
model (P = .001). Based on the Bayesian posterior probability that each participant belonged to 
the more selfish group (mean generosity = $0.95, s.d. = $0.71) or the more generous group 
(mean generosity = $8.53, s.d. = $4.82), we classified 34 participants into the Selfish group (< 
$2.50 sacrificed) and 17 participants into the Generous group. We used this behavioral 
classification in several of the analyses reported below. 
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B. DIFFERENCES IN GENEROSITY CORRELATE WITH DIFFERENCES IN 
DECISION TIME.  
 
Previous studies of reciprocal interactions suggest that overriding self-interest recruits cognitive 
control regions8,22,23. We analyzed reaction times (RTs) to look for behavioral evidence of 
similar patterns in our experiment. Across the entire group (excluding 7 participants who made 
fewer than four generous choices), generous choices took significantly longer than selfish 
choices (RTG = 2,131 ms, s.d. = 280 ms, RTS = 2,300 ms, s.d. = 310 ms, paired t43 = 4.97, P < 
0.0001). However, we found considerable differences between the two behaviorally defined 
groups (Fig. 1D). Although the groups did not differ in overall RT (t49 = .36, P = 0.72), Selfish 
participants took considerably longer to make generous compared to selfish choices (RTG = 
2,358 ms, s.d. = 313 ms, RTS = 2,110 ms, s.d. = 242 ms, paired t26 = 6.29, P < 0.0001), while 
Generous participants showed no evidence of this effect (RTG = 2,207 ms, s.d. = 291 ms, RTS = 
2,164 ms, s.d. = 338 ms, paired t16 = .87, P = 0.39; two-sample t42 = 3.25, P = 0.002). The 
pattern of reaction times shows that computations associated with more altruism take longer, but 
they are silent about the extent to which direct or normative processes are at work. For this 
question we turn to the neural data.   
 
C. DLPFC SUPPORTS NORMATIVE PREFERENCES  
 
One possibility (supported by our analysis) is that normative preferences promote behavior that 
is consistent with a shared social or ethical belief (e.g., give to another whenever the cost is 
sufficiently low). A neural mechanism supporting this preference could affect behavior either by 
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changing the values assigned to the options in areas such as vmPFC, or by directly influencing 
the action selection process. Critically, to the extent that the value of complying with the shared 
belief is reflected in value signals in vmPFC, this should be the case at the time of decision, but 
need not be so when the probabilistic outcome is announced. For an individual driven solely by 
normative preferences, the ideal situation is one in which he behaves altruistically (thus reaping 
the benefits from complying with the shared belief), but his choice is reversed exogenously (so 
that he ends up not having to give up his own money). 
Based on this, the following three markers should characterize a region involved in 
implementing normative preferences: 1) it should be more active when a person behaves 
altruistically (since the more active the mechanism, the more likely it is to influence behavior); 
2) its connectivity profile should be consistent with either the modulation of value signals at the 
time of choice in areas like vmPFC, or with the inhibition of selfish impulses by directly 
influencing the action selection process; and 3) reliance on these processes implies that an 
exogenous, random reversal of those generous choices should be experienced as subjectively 
rewarding, because the person reaps the reward related to acting in compliance with social norms 
and the reward associated with the outcome he would otherwise prefer in the absence of social 
norm considerations. Based on previous work in self-control 26,29 and altruistic choice8,22, we 
hypothesized that the dlPFC might satisfy these criteria. 
To test the first hypothesis, we looked for regions displaying greater activity during generous 
compared to selfish choices during the decision period (see Online Methods, GLM 1). As 
expected, generous choices were characterized by greater activation in the right dlPFC (Fig. 2A, 
Supplementary Table 1, P < 0.001 uncorrected, P = .04 small-volume corrected, SVC), as well 
as a region of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC ) previously associated with conflict 
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monitoring and cognitive control30,31 (P < 0.05, whole-brain corrected). ROI analysis further 
indicated that increased activity in the right dlPFC on generous compared to selfish choice trials 
correlated positively with longer RTs to choose generously (robust reg. coef. = .27, p = .01), 
supporting a relation between this region and use of cognitive control.  Activity in the dACC did 
not correlate with RT differences (robust reg. coef. = .21, p = .17). 
To test the second hypothesis—that normative preferences imply inhibition of selfish 
impulses and the selection of norm-consistent behavioral responses—we estimated a 
psychophysiological interaction (PPI) model to compare the connectivity profile of the dlPFC 
during generous and selfish choices. We focused on this region rather than the dACC both 
because of the considerable literature linking it to self-control27 and behavioral inhibition25,26, 
and because only the dlPFC correlated with differences in RT. Consistent with the characteristics 
of a normative mechanism for generous choice, we found that that during generous compared to 
selfish choice the dlPFC exhibited stronger negative connectivity with an area of the vmPFC 
associated with the computation of values at the time of choice27,32 as well as stronger positive 
connectivity with areas of supplementary motor (SMA) and inferior parietal (IPL) cortex 
previously associated with response selection33–35 (Fig. 2B, Supplementary Table 2, p < .05, 
corrected).  
Finally, to test the hypothesis that implementation of normative mechanisms via behavioral 
suppression results in a distinction between preferences over actions and preferences over 
outcomes, we exploited a unique feature of our experimental design: the 40% of trials on which a 
subject’s  choice  is  vetoed.  We  hypothesized  that  reward-related response to veto vs. receipt of 
generous choices in an independently defined area of vmPFC shown to track the subjective 
pleasantness of consuming a stimulus36 should correlate with activation in the dlPFC, if the 
  
73 
73 
dlPFC implements normative mechanisms during choice. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
response in the vmPFC when generous choices were vetoed (resulting in the non-chosen option) 
was higher than when generous choices were received, to the extent that participants activated 
the dlPFC during generous compared to selfish choices (Fig. 2C, robust reg. coef. = .44, p < 
.001).  
Taken together, these three results are consistent with the hypothesis that the dlPFC 
implements normative mechanisms for norm-consistent behavior, both by suppressing the 
influence of value-related regions like the vmPFC, and by directly modulating behavioral 
response selection.  
 
D. TEMPOROPARIETAL JUNCTION AND ROSTRAL ANTERIOR CINGULATE 
CORTEX SUPPORT DIRECT PREFERENCES.  
 
We used a similar logic and set of steps to identify regions associated with direct preferences. 
Direct preferences imply that a person represents not only his own welfare ($Self) but also his 
partner’s  ($Partner).  Importantly,  these  computations  apply  not  just  during  choice,  but  also  at  
outcome. An individual driven solely by direct preferences cares  about  others’  outcomes, and not 
about his actions per se. This individual would be indifferent between having made the decision 
to act generously and having that decision determined for him, as long as the distribution of 
outcomes remains the same. 
Based on this, the following three markers should characterize a region involved in 
implementing direct preferences: 1) its activity should correlate with the value of $Partner on 
each trial; 2) its activity should correlate with stated preferences for different options; 3) its 
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connectivity profile should be consistent with feeding of information about $Partner to regions 
involved in valuation and/or response selection; 4) use of this neural mechanism to choose 
generously implies a genuine preference over outcomes, making exogenously imposed, random 
reversal of those generous choices (resulting in unchosen outcomes) subjectively unpleasant. 
Based on research in the social cognition16 and value-based decision making18,32,34,37 literature, 
we hypothesized that regions related to social cognition, such as the TPJ, and/or regions related 
to valuation at the time of choice, such as the vmPFC or ACC, might satisfy these minimally 
necessary criteria. 
To test the first hypothesis, we looked for brain regions whose activity was consistent with 
representing the amount $Partner at the time of choice. This analysis identified several regions in 
which responses during the choice period correlated with $Partner (Fig. 3A, Supplementary 
Table 3), including right temporoparietal junction (TPJ), left TPJ/angular gyrus, and precuneus 
(p < .05, corrected) as well as the rostral ACC (rACC; p < .001 uncorrected, p = .004 SVC). 
Several regions also represented $Self (Fig. 3B, Supplementary Table 4), including ventral 
striatum and ACC (p < .05, corrected).  A direct contrast of response to $Partner and $Self 
confirmed that activity in both right (p < .05, corrected) and left (p < .001, uncorrected) TPJ was 
specific to $Partner while other regions, including both the amygdala (p < .05, corrected) and the 
ventral striatum, marginally (p < .08, SVC), responded uniquely to $Self (Supplementary Table 
5) but not to $Partner. In contrast, rACC responded equally to both, consistent with its 
hypothesized role in computating integrated value signals27. Importantly, the representation of 
$Partner did not differ as a function of whether participants chose generously or selfishly on a 
given trial for either the left TPJ or the rACC (all P = n.s.), suggesting that these regions 
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represented $Partner to a similar degree on all choices regardless of whether that representation 
resulted in generosity or not, and thus could serve as precursors to choice. 
To test the second hypothesis that areas representing $Partner also contribute to valuation 
during decision-making we looked for overlap between the neural correlates of stated 
preferences (given by the participant’s  ratings  of  the  proposal),  and  regions  representing  
$Partner. Note that these two analyses are independent of each other: identifying regions 
correlated with stated preferences does not assume any particular relationship to $Self or 
$Partner, although it does not preclude such a relationship. As expected, we identified several 
regions where subjective preferences (Fig. 3C) overlapped with the representation of $Partner, 
including the left TPJ/angular gyrus and rACC (Fig. 3D, Supplementary Table 6,7). 
To test the third hypothesis, we examined the connectivity profile of the left TPJ region 
correlating with both $Partner and stated preferences. Although the TPJ has not often been 
implicated in decision-value computation37, we hypothesized that it may influence behavior 
during social decision-making by providing inputs to the rostral ACC region associated with 
valuation and/or to response selection regions. Consistent with this hypothesis, a 
psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis (see SOM for details) indicated that, during 
choice, functional connectivity increased between left TPJ and the area of ACC associated with 
$P as well as with areas of IPL and SMA involved in response selection33-35 (Fig. 4A, P < 0.05 
corrected, Supplementary Table 8), suggesting that social value computations supported by the 
TPJ may influence choices not only indirectly through modulation of value computations in the 
rACC, but also directly by modulating the selection of behavioral responses.  
Finally, we tested the prediction that the use of direct mechanisms implies similar 
preferences at both decision and outcome. In contrast to normative mechanisms, where randomly 
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vetoing generous choices results is experienced as rewarding, direct preferences imply that veto 
of generous choices should be associated with less reward. To test this, we correlated 
representation of $Partner in the TPJ and rACC (where representation and valuation of $Partner 
overlapped) with response to generous choice veto vs. receipt at outcome in the region of vmPFC 
associated with subjective utility. Consistent with the hypothesis that direct preferences imply 
consistency between preferences at choice and outcome, response in the vmPFC when generous 
choices were vetoed was lower to the extent that rACC demonstrated sensitivity to $Partner (Fig. 
4B, robust reg. coef. = -.32, P = 0.009) and non-significantly for the lTPJ (robust reg. coef. = -.2, 
P = 0.13).  
Taken together, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that direct preferences are 
implemented through the representation and valuation of $Partner in lTPJ and rACC. 
 
E. DEPLOYMENT OF NORMATIVE AND DIRECT MECHANISMS IS NEGATIVELY 
CORRELATED ACROSS PARTICIPANTS. 
 
The previous results establish the existence of two computationally and neurobiologically 
dissociable mechanisms that promote altruistic behavior. This leads to a natural question: Is the 
extent to which these mechanisms are deployed independent, positively correlated, or negatively 
correlated? The answer is not obvious a priori, and it is hard to speculate based on previous data. 
For example, given their distinct neural bases, the two mechanisms might be deployed 
independently. This would imply that more generous individuals would be more likely to engage 
in both types of processes. Perhaps more interestingly, subjects might deploy the normative 
preference mechanism only when their direct preferences are not sufficiently strong to lead them 
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to comply with the shared social norms, in which case they would be negatively correlated in the 
population. 
Our design allows us to address this question, by using dlPFC responses as a measure of the 
extent to which the normative mechanism is deployed, and rACC and lTPJ responses as a 
measure of the extent to which the direct mechanism is deployed.  We found a negative 
correlation across participants between recruitment of dlPFC on generous choices and 
representation of $Partner in both the lTPJ (robust reg. coef. = -0.33, p < .001) and rACC (robust 
reg. coef. = -.4, p < .005). This observation suggests that, to the extent that a person uses direct 
mechanisms (which may more naturally lead to generous choices), he tends not to use normative 
self-control mechanisms, perhaps because using self-control is effortful and thus deployed only 
when necessary.  
 
F. NORMATIVE AND DIRECT MECHANISMS SHOW DIFFERENT PATTERNS OF 
CORRELATION WITH LEVELS OF GENEROSITY ACROSS INDIVIDUALS.  
 
Finally, we examined in the data the extent to which individual generosity was correlated with 
the relative reliance on the two processes. Note that the answer to this question is also not 
obvious a priori. On the one hand, since individuals activate the normative mechanism only 
when their direct preferences are weak, one might expect a negative correlation between 
generosity and reliance on normative preferences. On the other hand, there are no a priori 
constraints in our experiment on the strength of the shared social belief, and thus the activation 
of normative motives could be enough to compensate for weak direct preferences. 
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We found that stronger dlPFC activation was associated with less generosity overall (robust 
reg. coef. = -.61, p < .001). Indeed, examining Selfish and Generous participants separately, we 
observed that the Selfish group showed a robust increase in dlPFC, while Generous participants 
showed none (Fig. 5A).  In contrast, we observed a positive correlation between behavioral 
generosity and neural representation of $Partner in the left TPJ (robust reg. coef. = .6, p < .001), 
although this relation failed to reach significance in the rACC (robust reg. coef. = .14, p = .19). 
Indeed, whereas the TPJ showed a strong and specific sensitivity to $Partner in the Generous 
group, it showed little differential response in the Selfish group (Fig. 5B). Because these two 
mechanisms were negatively correlated with each other, we also used multiple regression to test 
the degree to which each mechanism correlated with generosity when controlling for the other. 
This analysis indicated that lTPJ response to $Partner independently correlated with generosity 
(b = 53.46, s.e. = 17.39, p = .004), while dlPFC response marginally negatively correlated with 
generosity (b = -1.15, s.e. = .59, p = .06). 
 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
This study examined the computational and neurobiological basis of simple, anonymous 
altruistic decision-making. The study allowed us to address the following three open questions: 
1) Are computations in areas such as mPFC, vStr, and dlPFC associated with implementing 
normative preferences, direct preferences, or both? 2) How much do individuals use these two 
neural mechanisms, and how do they interact within individuals? 3) What is the association 
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between the two mechanisms and the tendency to make generous choices? Our results advance 
our understanding of each of these questions.  
First, our results support the existence of dissociable neurobiological mechanisms for each 
type of preference, and provide insights about the computations carried out by areas like vmPFC, 
vSt, dlPFC, and TPJ in altruistic choice. Activity in a region of dlPFC associated with cognitive 
control27,29 was consistent with the deployment of normative preferences: 1) when participants 
chose generously, this region showed greater activity and correlated with reaction times; 2) 
connectivity analysis suggested that it down-modulated a region of vmPFC involved in valuation 
and up-modulated motor control areas, and 3) activity in this region during decision-making 
predicted positive responses at outcome to generous choice veto in a region of vmPFC associated 
with subjective utility. We interpret this as evidence that the dlPFC mechanism enables pro-
social  choices  even  when  participants  did  not  care  directly  about  another’s  well-being (or did not 
care enough). By contrast, responses in the TPJ and rACC, regions associated with social 
cognition and valuation16,32 were consistent with the deployment of direct preferences: 1) these 
regions  displayed  activity  that  correlated  both  with  the  magnitude  of  the  partner’s  payoff and 
with  participants’  stated  preferences;;  2)  these  regions  displayed  functional  connectivity  with  
each other and with regions involved in motor planning at choice; and 3) weighting of $Partner 
in rACC during decision-making predicted negative responses at outcome to generous choice 
veto in vmPFC. 
Second, our results suggest that different individuals deploy these two processes to varying 
degrees. Behaviorally, levels of generosity suggested the existence of two groups: one relatively 
selfish group and a second considerably more generous group. These behavioral distinctions 
were associated with qualitatively different patterns of neural activation. The majority of 
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participants fell into the first group and for the range of choices we studied displayed evidence of 
relying when giving on normative preferences implemented by the right dlPFC. A smaller group 
displayed evidence of a reliance on direct preferences implemented in left TPJ and rACC. 
Importantly,  the  more  participants  represented  their  partner’s  outcomes—both behaviorally and 
neurally—the less they recruited the dlPFC mechanism in order to make a generous choice. This 
suggests that while both motives may be active in some individuals, they tend to be deployed in 
complementary fashion.  
Third, we found that when our subjects relied on the dlPFC-based mechanism for normative 
preferences they tended to give less, while when they used the TPJ-based mechanism for direct 
preferences they tended to give more. This finding provides the seed for further investigations of 
the relative role of the two mechanisms across settings and across individuals. The particular 
correlations  we  observe  in  our  data  might  reflect  more  on  our  subjects’  shared  view  of  the  social  
norms in this particular context than about underlying differences in the effectiveness of the two 
mechanisms. Indeed, we suspect that in situations where social norms dictate higher levels of 
giving (either in other cultures or other contexts), and in contexts where social norms have more 
bite (e.g., non-anonymous giving), use of normative mechanisms may be associated with greater 
generosity. Future work will be needed to determine whether such contexts induce greater giving 
in the subset of people relying on self-control and normative motives to give.  
Our results have potential implications for several domains. First, social neuroscience studies 
have found that the TPJ, particularly in the right hemisphere, plays a critical role in the ability to 
characterize the mental states of others16,38 (e.g., by taking their perspective), and our results 
corroborate other accounts that implicate the TPJ in charitable giving18,39. However, our results 
differ in important ways from prior work. While both right and left TPJ correlated with $Partner 
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in our study, the process of translating this into a reward-related value seemed to be more 
strongly related to a region of the left TPJ extending posteriorly into the angular gyrus. This 
suggests that there may be some important structural distinctions between simply representing 
and  actually  valuing  another’s  welfare,  and  future  work  will  need  to  address  the  key  
computations required to internalize the well-being of another person when computing the values 
of social decisions. In particular, it will be important to understand whether differences in TPJ-
related generosity have purely social-cognitive roots, or whether they arise out of more basic, 
non-social functions, such as attentional orienting40. These questions have practical implications 
for understanding diseases like autism, which are characterized by structural differences in 
regions like the TPJ and ACC41 as well as differences in social behavior, including charitable 
giving42. 
Our work also has implications for understanding the role that basic individual traits like the 
ability to exercise self-control have in altruistic choice.  In our study, the deployment of self-
control via the dlPFC was associated with an apparent disconnect between what people chose to 
do and what they wanted to occur. Studies of non-social decision-making have found that a 
similar area of dlPFC to the one identified here plays a critical role in the ability to choose 
options that promote long-term goals27,43 and may induce a similar disconnect between stated 
preferences and underlying motivation in non-social contexts as well44. In these contexts, 
difficulty making adaptive, far-sighted choices is often seen as a failure of self-control. By 
analogy, selfish choices should not automatically be seen as evidence that people do not care 
about others, or do not care about social norms. Rather, such behavior may simply reflect an 
inability to properly exert self-control. This problem may be particularly acute for children, 
because dlPFC areas mediating the ability to control selfish impulses develop only slowly24. 
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Educational programs that improve both direct mechanisms (e.g., perspective-taking) and 
normative mechanisms (e.g., self-control) may thus yield more consistent pro-social behavior. 
Finally, the use of neuroeconomic insights to make inferences about motives for giving at the 
individual level may be a valuable tool with diverse applications. In scientific contexts, it can be 
used to contribute insight into long-standing scientific debates about the prevalence of different 
motives in different types of altruistic behavior. Much more speculatively, it may influence the 
design of institutions concerned with promoting public welfare and pro-social behavior. For 
example, our results suggest that the answer to economic policy debates on the relative benefits 
of tax-provided public goods vs. voluntary giving to charity may depend largely on the 
individual who is taxed. Mandatory taxation reduces the welfare of those motivated primarily by 
normative preferences (perhaps the majority  of  individuals)  by  denying  them  the  “warm  glow”  
of acting charitably45, while perhaps increasing the welfare of those motivated by direct 
preferences by improving the outcomes of others. The ability to identify these motives within 
individuals may help to determine the aggregate (group-level) benefit resulting from different 
interventions.  
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Figure 1.  Design and behavioral results. A) Trial structure.  B) Proposed transfers used in the 
experiment describing $ Self and $ Partner. The alternative was always a transfer of $50 to both 
subjects. X- and Y-axes represent distance from default offer. The filled area in each transfer is 
proportional to the percentage of pro-social choices across all participants. C) Distribution of 
generosity across participants, given by the cumulative amount of money he sacrificed over the 
course of the experiment. A model in which observations came from two distributions best 
accounts for the observed levels of generosity (maximum likelihood fit; Selfish group—green, 
Generous group—blue). D) Differences in average reaction time for Selfish (dark bars) and 
Generous (light bars) choices, separately for Selfish and Generous groups. Error bars indicate 
standard error of the mean.  ** P < .01 
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Figure 2.  Right dlPFC and normative mechanisms of generous choice. A) Right dlPFC 
responded more strongly on generous vs. selfish choice trials. B) vmPFC showed decreased 
connectivity with the dlPFC on generous choice trials, while SMA and inferior parietal cortex 
showed increased connectivity. C) Right dlPFC increases during generous choice negatively 
predict vmPFC response to vetoed vs. received generous choices at outcome. To make the robust 
regression coefficient equivalent to a standard correlation statistic, both variables were 
normalized prior to regression. 
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Figure 3. Neural responsiveness to $S, $P, and subjective preference. A) Regions in which 
activity increased with $Partner; B) Regions in which activity increased with $Self.  C) Regions 
demonstrating sensitivity to an independent estimate of stated preference for the proposal. D) 
Overlap. Red = $Partner, Blue = $Self, Green = Stated Preference. Images thresholded at P < 
.0005, uncorrected. Red circles - left and right TPJ; black circles - ventral striatum; green circles 
- mPFC/rACC. 
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Figure 4.  Left TPJ, rACC and direct mechanisms of generous choice. A) Left TPJ demonstrated 
increased functional connectivity with the rACC, SMA and inferior parietal cortex during the 
choice period. B) rACC relative weighting of $Partner positively predicts vmPFC response to 
vetoed vs. received generous choices at outcome. To make the robust regression coefficient 
equivalent to a standard correlation statistic, both variables were normalized prior to regression. 
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Figure 5. Extracted betas from ROIs.  A) dlPFC was more active on generous (light bars) vs. 
selfish choice trials (dark bars) only in the Selfish group of subjects. B) lTPJ represents $Partner 
(light bars) rather than $Self (dark bars) only in the Generous group of subjects.  Error bars 
indicate standard error of the mean.  ** P < .01  
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Supplementary Table 1.  Regions displaying differential activity on generous vs. selfish choice 
trials at the time of choice (GLM 1) 
 
 
Region BA 
Cluster 
Size 
Z 
score x y z 
Unselfish > Selfish 
L Anterior cingulate cortex 32 86 4.03 -3 33 36 
R DLPFC 45/46 24 4.26* 54 12 21 
        
Unselfish < Selfish 
R Occipital Cortex 18 577 4.81 27 -96 12 
 
Note: 
Regions are reported if they passed two thresholds: p < .001 uncorrected and p < .05 cluster 
corrected, unless otherwise noted.   
* p = .04, SVC within a bilateral anatomical mask of lateral PFC (see Online Methods for 
details). 
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Supplementary Table 2.  Regions exhibiting differential connectivity with dlPFC on generous vs. 
selfish trials at the time of choice (PPI 1) 
 
 
Region BA 
Cluster 
Size 
Z 
score x y z 
Generous > Selfish 
R Occipital cortex 17/18/19 7365 6.52 24 -78 -12 
L Occipital cortex 17/18/19 a 6.51 -24 -96 9 
L Inferior parietal lobule 40 a 6.3 -33 -51 48 
R Inferior parietal lobule 40 a 6.1 27 -63 39 
L Supplementary motor cortex  349 5.75 -6 9 42 
L Thalamus  264 5.28 -12 -15 6 
R Anterior insula 13 126 5.04 36 21 3 
R Middle frontal gyrus 6/9 229 4.93 39 3 36 
R Middle frontal gyrus 6 48 3.94 24 -6 51 
R Posterior cingulate gyrus 23 52 3.83 6 -30 30 
R Thalamus  53 3.75 12 0 0 
L Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 10/46 57 3.74 -33 42 18 
        
Generous < Selfish 
L Angular gyrus 40 287 5.85 -36 -81 42 
L Middle frontal gyrus 8 49 4.74 -21 27 57 
L 
Anterior 
cingulate/ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex 10/32 165 4.49 -6 42 -6 
R Angular gyrus 40 131 4.4 45 -75 42 
L Superior frontal gyrus 9/10 36 3.99 -15 51 27 
 
Note: 
Regions are reported if they passed two thresholds: p < .001 uncorrected and p < .05 cluster 
corrected, unless otherwise noted.   
a. Distinct peak in larger cluster of activation, reported separately for completeness.  
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Supplementary Table 3. Regions correlating with $Partner (GLM 2) 
 
 
Region BA 
Cluster 
Size 
Z 
score x y z 
R Anterior cingulate cortex 24 45 3.82* 9 36 3 
L 
Inferior parietal lobule/ 
temporoparietal junction 7/39 217 4.71 -24 -48 24 
L Precuneus 7/31 494 4.89 -9 -60 45 
R Temporoparietal junction 39 63 3.92 39 -63 21 
L Occipital cortex 30 61 4.51 -30 -63 12 
R Occipital cortex 18 76 4.22 21 -90 -9 
L Cerebellum  152 4.24 -24 -93 -27 
 Occipital cortex 18 a 4.17 -18 -96 -12 
 
Note: 
Regions are reported if they passed two thresholds: p < .001 uncorrected and p < .05 cluster 
corrected, unless otherwise noted.   
* p = .003, small-volume corrected within an anatomically defined mask of the mPFC (see 
Online Methods for details).  
a. Distinct peak in larger cluster of activation, reported separately for completeness.  
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Supplementary Table 4.  Regions correlating with $Self (GLM 2) 
 
 
Region BA 
Cluster 
Size 
Z 
score x y z 
L Anterior cingulate/ 24/32 180 4.8 -3 39 6 
 Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 11/32 a 4.49 6 33 -12 
R Inferior frontal gyrus 44 24 4.62 48 3 15 
L Precentral gyrus 6 19 4.59 -48 0 45 
R Supplementary motor area 6 441 5.62 3 -9 54 
R Precentral gyrus 3/4 68 4.15 42 -18 57 
R Postcentral gyrus 3 55 5.06 57 -21 30 
L Postcentral gyrus 4 1234 6.43 -33 -27 51 
 Posterior cingulate cortex 23/31 a 5.12 -3 -36 39 
 Occipital cortex (L) 18/19 a 6.29 -36 -81 -12 
R Occipital cortex 18/19 4882 6.36 21 -99 -3 
R Ventral striatum  84 5.33 9 12 -9 
L Ventral striatum  52 5.1 -9 12 -3 
 
Note: 
Regions are reported if they passed two thresholds: p < .0001 uncorrected and p < .05 cluster 
corrected, unless otherwise noted.  This more stringent threshold was used to better separate 
clusters of activation. 
a. Distinct peak in larger cluster of activation, reported separately for completeness.  
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Supplementary Table 5. Differences in correlation with $Partner and $Self (GLM 2) 
 
 
Region BA 
Cluster 
Size 
Z 
score x y z 
Correlation with Other Amount  > Self Amount 
L Middle frontal gyrus 9 24 3.75 -39 15 36 
R Temporoparietal junction 39/40 29 3.93 54 -54 27 
L Angular gyrus/temporoparietal 
junction 39 10 3.29* -48 -69 39 
        Correlation with Self Amount  > Other Amount 
L Postcentral gyrus 3/4 240 4.17 -36 -27 72 
R Fusiform gyrus 19 17 3.52 27 -66 -12 
L Inferior occipital cortex 19 45 3.94 -45 -72 -6 
R Inferior occipital cortex 19 30 3.69 36 -72 -12 
R Occipital cortex 18/19 347 4.82 30 -75 21 
R Lingual gyrus 18 20 3.62 12 -78 -12 
L Middle occipital gyrus 18/19 332 4.15 -27 -96 9 
R Cerebellum 
 
74 4.61 21 -60 -27 
L Ventral striatum 
 
16 3.27† -9 9 -9 
R Amygdala 
 
21 3.94 30 0 -18 
 
Note: 
Regions are reported if they passed two thresholds: p < .001 uncorrected and p < .05 cluster 
corrected, unless otherwise noted.  
* p < .001, uncorrected; p = .07, small-volume corrected within an anatomically defined mask of 
the bilateral temporoparietal junction 
† p < .005, uncorrected; p = .08 small-volume corrected within an anatomically defined mask of 
the ventral striatum (see Online Methods for details)  
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Supplementary Table 6.  Regions correlating with stated preferences at the time of choice (GLM 
3). 
 
Region BA 
Cluster 
Size Z score x y z 
L Superior frontal gyrus 10 75 4.9 -12 60 27 
B Anterior cingulate cortex 24/32 680 5.37 3 39 18 
 L Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 11/32 a 5.01 -6 33 -12 
 R Ventral striatum  a 5.29 9 12 -6 
 L Ventral striatum  a 5.13 -9 12 -6 
L Middle frontal gyrus 6/8 49 4.36 -21 24 54 
R Precentral gyrus 6 32 4.33 63 3 24 
L Mid-cingulate cortex 24 53 4.27 -3 -6 39 
R Supplementary Motor Area 6 16 4.28 6 -12 72 
L Precentral gyrus 4 90 4.86 -39 -15 57 
L Postcentral gyrus 4 216 5.06 -21 -27 72 
R Superior temporal gyrus 21/22 38 4.63 60 -30 6 
L Superior temporal gyrus 22/41 179 4.91 -63 -36 9 
L Posterior cingulate cortex 31 186 5.64 -6 -42 42 
R Inferior temporal gyrus 37 35 5.42 54 -42 -21 
L Inferior parietal cortex 7 72 4.48 -36 -75 42 
B Occipital cortex 18/19 3430 6.23 -6 -102 0 
 Occipital cortex 18/19 a 5.3 18 -96 15 
 
Note: 
Regions are reported if they passed two thresholds: p < .0001 uncorrected and p < .05 cluster 
corrected, unless otherwise noted.   
a. Distinct peak in larger cluster of activation, reported separately for completeness.  
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Supplementary Table 7.  Regions exhibiting overlap between $Partner or $Self and stated 
preferences (GLM 2 & GLM 3). 
 
Region BA 
Cluster 
Size x y z 
Overlap between $Partner and Stated Preference 
L Precuneus 7 90 -9 -54 42 
R Occipital cortex 17/18 62 21 -90 -9 
L Occipital cortex 17/18 43 -18 -96 -12 
L 
Angular gyrus/temporoparietal 
junction 39 31 -48 -69 39 
L Cerebellum 
 
31 -24 -93 -27 
R Precuneus 7 28 3 -78 33 
R Anterior cingulate cortex 24/32 21 9 36 3 
       
Overlap between $Self and Stated Preference 
R Occipital cortex 17/18 4559 21 -99 -3 
L Occipital cortex 17/18 a -36 -81 -12 
L Postcentral gyrus 4 604 -33 -27 51 
L Anterior cingulate cortex 32 350 -3 39 6 
L Mid-cingulate cortex 31 204 -3 -36 39 
R Supplementary Motor Area 6 192 3 -9 54 
R Ventral Striatum 
 
175 9 12 -9 
L Superior temporal gyrus 41 175 -51 -33 18 
R Inferior frontal gyrus 6/44 36 48 3 15 
R Superior parietal lobule 7 31 30 -57 54 
L Insula 13 29 -45 -9 21 
R Supramarginal gyrus 41 24 57 -21 30 
 
Note: 
Regions are reported if they were jointly significant for both contrasts at p < .0005, uncorrected, 
with at least 20 voxel overlap. 
a. Distinct peak in larger cluster of activation, reported separately for completeness.  
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Supplementary Table 8.  Regions exhibiting functional connectivity with left TPJ at choice (PPI 
2).  
 
Region BA 
Cluster 
Size 
Z 
score x y z 
L 
Supplementary motor area/anterior 
cingulate cortex 8/32 3649 6.09 -3 9 39 
R Middle frontal gyrus 4 a 4.71 45 3 39 
L Inferior parietal cortex 7 a 4.9 -24 -48 51 
R Inferior parietal cortex 7 a 4.91 24 -54 54 
R Precuneus 7 a 7.12 9 -48 54 
R Anterior cingulate cortex 32 5 3.91* 0 36 12 
R Middle frontal gyrus 9 178 5.89 33 39 39 
L Insula 13 317 5.8 -36 -9 -6 
L Supramarginal gyrus 40 312 5.66 -60 -33 24 
R Posterior middle temporal gyrus 37 221 5.07 54 -57 0 
L Middle frontal gyrus 9 59 4.93 -30 48 39 
L Thalamus  189 4.92 -12 -9 15 
L Postcentral gyrus 4 25 4.7 -42 -15 51 
L Amygdala 34 40 4.68 -21 3 -18 
R Thalamus  32 4.38 18 -15 15 
R Occipital cortex 19 31 4.36 33 -90 21 
L Cerebellum  21 4.19 -36 -51 -33 
L Cerebellum  16 4.19 -18 -63 -24 
R Subcallosal gyrus 34 16 4.1 18 9 -15 
 
Note: 
Regions are reported if they passed two thresholds: p < .0001 uncorrected and p < .05 cluster 
corrected, unless otherwise noted.   
a. Distinct peak in larger cluster of activation, reported separately for completeness.  
* p < .05, SVC within a mask of the ACC region associated with $P at p < .001, uncorrected, 
reported for completeness. 
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Appendix 1.  
METHODS 
 
Subjects. Male volunteers (N = 122) were recruited in pairs from the Caltech community.  
Subjects were right-handed, healthy, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no history of 
psychiatric or neurological conditions, and free of medications that might interfere with fMRI. 
Data from ten pairs was excluded from the analyses due to excessive head motion (more than 
3mm total translation or 3 degrees total rotation in any single volume) or technical difficulties 
during the scanning session (mean age 22.3, range 18-35, for the remaining subjects). All 
subjects received a show-up fee of $30, as well as $0-$100 more depending on the outcome of a 
randomly chosen experimental trial.  All procedures were approved by the internal review board 
of the California Institute of Technology, and subjects provided informed consent prior to their 
participation in the experiment. 
 
Task. Each subject in a pair arrived separately to the lab, and was escorted to separate waiting 
areas where he received task instructions. In each pair, one subject was randomly designated as 
the (active) participant, and completed the tasks described below. The other was designated as 
the (passive) partner, and after receiving instructions, waited in a separate room for the duration 
of the study. Although participants never met, and the partner made no decisions, his presence 
was important to provide a real social context for the participants.  
The active participant read the rules of the decision task, and completed three practice trials.  
Then, on each of 180 trials in the scanner, he saw a proposed transfer consisting of an amount of 
money for himself ($Self) and an amount for his partner ($Partner). The side of the screen on 
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which $Self appeared was counterbalanced across subjects. Participants had up to four seconds 
to choose between the proposed transfer, and a default transfer of $50 to both players. If the 
participant failed to respond within four seconds, the payoff for both individuals was $0 for that 
trial.  Participants indicated their decisions using a 4-point scale: Strong No, No, Yes, Strong 
Yes. This allowed us to measure simultaneously their choice, and the strength of their 
preferences at the time of decision. To decouple motor activity from preference signals, the 
direction indicating increasing preference (right-to-left or left-to-right) varied randomly each 
trial.  
The proposal shown in each trial was drawn from one of the nine pairs shown in Fig. 1B. 
Each pair appeared 20 times, randomly intermixed across subjects, and divided evenly across 
four scanner runs (5 instances per run). To minimize habituation and repetition effects, proposals 
(which ranged from $10 to $100) were randomly jittered by $1–$4 in each dimension, with the 
exception that amounts above $100 were always jittered downwards.  Due to an error in coding, 
both self and other proposals were jittered by the same amount. 
After  the  participant’s response, a fixation cross appeared for a random delay of 2–4 seconds 
(average  =  3  sec),  followed  by  the  trial’s  outcome  displayed  for  3  seconds  (Fig.  1A).  The 
outcome was stochastic: 60% of trials resulted in the chosen option (green check), while 40% 
resulted in the non-chosen option (red cross).  
At the end of the experiment the outcome of one trial was selected randomly to determine the 
pay for both participants. To minimize the extent to which reciprocity considerations play a role 
in the experiment, participants never met their partner, and were assured that their identity would 
never be revealed.  Moreover, participants knew that their partner would only know the final 
outcome for the randomly selected trial, and not their actual choice, and that during the 
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instruction period the partner was informed about the outcome randomization procedure 
described above. Participants were also assured that their partner was a real person, that no 
deception was being used in the experiment, and were asked to affirm that they believed this. All 
participants indicated a belief that their decisions affected a real partner, both before and after the 
scanner task. 
  
Behavioral analyses.  Subject-level generosity was measured by the average amount of money 
per trial that a subject sacrificed to increase their  partner’s  payoffs.  For  example,  compared  to  the  
default ($S = $50, $P = $50), accepting ($S = $25, $P = $100) entails a sacrifice of $25 on that 
trial. Fig. 1C depicts the distribution of generosity across subjects. We considered several 
alternative natural measures of subject-level generosity (such as money given to partner), which 
led to very similar results.  In addition, we label a choice as Generous if the participant sacrificed 
to help the partner (i.e., accepting $Self < $50, rejecting $Self > $50), and Selfish otherwise. 
The histogram of subject-level generosity suggested that the population might consist of a 
mixture of types with different levels of generosity. We tested this hypothesis formally by 
estimating the parameters of two models using Bayesian methods, using the package rjags46 
written for R47), and then carrying out a model comparison between them. The first model 
assumes  that  subjects’  mean  generosity  is  drawn  from  a  mixture  of  two  normally  distributed  
populations. The model is characterized by five parameters: means (μ1, μ2) and standard 
deviations (σ1, σ2)  for  the  two  groups’  distributions,  and  a  mixing  parameter  λ indicating the 
probability  that  a  subject’s  generosity  level  is  drawn  from  the  first  group.  We  assumed  largely  
uninformative priors for all parameters: a uniform distribution on [0,5] for μ1, a uniform 
distribution on [2.5,20] on μ2, uniform distributions on [0,100] for σ1 and σ2, and a Dirichlet 
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distribution with 1 observation for λ (this last simplifies the computations while maintaining an 
approximately uniform prior). Results of this analysis were robust to a wide range of prior 
specifications.  The second  model  assumes  that  subject’s  generosity  levels  are  drawn  from  a  
single normally-distributed population, and thus is characterized by two parameters: its mean μ 
and its standard deviation σ. The priors for this model were: uniform on [0,20] for μ and on 
[0,100] for σ.  We compared the two models by computing the difference in the log-likelihood 
for each. To compute the significance value for this difference, we ran the same procedure 1000 
times using simulated data based on the null hypothesis (normally distributed population with 
mean and standard deviation of the observed data) and computing the probability of a difference 
in the simulated log-likelihoods equal or larger in magnitude to the observed statistic48. 
 
fMRI data acquisition. BOLD responses were acquired using a Siemens 3.0 Tesla MRI scanner 
(Erlangen, Germany) to acquire gradient echo T2*-weighted echoplanar images (EPI). To 
optimize functional sensitivity in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), a key region of interest, we 
used a tilted acquisition in an oblique orientation of 30° to the anterior commissure–posterior 
commissure line49. In addition, we used a standard eight-channel phased array coil. Each volume 
comprised 45 axial slices. A total of 960 volumes were collected over four sessions during the 
experiment in an interleaved ascending manner.  The first two volumes of each session were 
discarded to allow for scanner equilibration.  The imaging parameters were as follows: echo 
time, 30 ms; field of view, 192 mm; in-plane resolution and slice thickness, 3 mm; repetition 
time, 2.75 s. Whole-brain high-resolution T1-weighted structural scans (1 x 1 x 1 mm) were 
acquired from the 51 subjects and coregistered with their mean EPI images and averaged 
together to permit anatomical localization of the functional activations at the group level. 
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fMRI data pre-processing. Image analysis was performed using SPM5 (Wellcome Department 
of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). Images were corrected for slice 
acquisition time within each volume, motion corrected with realignment to the last volume, 
spatially normalized to the standard Montreal Neurological Institute EPI template using affine 
transformation, and spatially smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with a full-width at half-
maximum of 8 mm. Intensity normalization and high-pass temporal filtering (using a filter width 
of 128 s) were also applied to the data.   
 
GLM 1. We estimated several general linear models (GLMs) of the BOLD data. The first model 
was designed to compare patterns of activity between trials in which subjects acted generously 
and trials in which they acted selfishly, and to compare the response at outcome as a function of 
whether a pro-social choice was vetoed or received. The model was analyzed in three steps. 
First, for each subject we estimated a GLM with AR(1) and the following regressors of 
interest: R1) A boxcar function for the choice period, which extends from proposal onset to the 
subject’s  response  for  the  trial, for generous trials only; R2) R1 modulated by the stated 
preference on that trial; R3) A boxcar function for the choice period during selfish trials only; 
R4) R3 modulated by the stated preference on that trial (coded as -1.5 = Strong No, -.5 = No, .5 
= Yes, 1.5 = Strong Yes); R5) an indicator function of the outcome period onset (i.e., a stick 
function of 0s duration) on trials in which a generous choice occurred and was implemented; R6) 
an indicator function of the outcome period onset on  trials in which a generous choice occurred 
and was reversed; R7) an indicator function of the outcome period onset on trials in which a 
selfish choice was made and was implemented; R8) an indicator function of the outcome period 
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onset on trials in which a selfish choice was made and reversed.  
Second, we calculated the following single-subject contrasts: 1) Generous vs. Selfish choice 
(R1–R3).  2) Preference on generous vs. selfish choice (R2–R4).  3) Reversed vs. implemented, 
generous choice (R6–R5).  4) Reversed vs. implemented selfish choice (R8–R7). All regressors 
were convolved with the canonical form of the hemodynamic response. Missed response trials 
were excluded from the above analysis. The model also included motion parameters and session 
constants as regressors of no interest. Due to estimation constraints, eight participants were 
excluded from contrasts 1 and 2 because they chose generously fewer than five times over the 
course of the experiment.  
Third, we computed second-level random effects analyses for each group of interest (All 
subjects, Selfish group, Generous group) by computing one-sample and two-sample t-tests on the 
single-subject contrast coefficients.  
For inference purposes, we imposed a cluster-corrected threshold of p < .05 (based on 
Gaussian random field theory as implemented in SPM5). We also report results in this and all 
analyses below that survived small-volume correction within regions for which we had strong a 
priori hypotheses (see ROI definition below), including medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), ventral 
striatum (vStr), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), and bilateral temporoparietal junction 
(TPJ). 
 
 
GLM 2. The second model was designed to identify regions in which activity responded to $Self 
or $Partner at the time of choice. It consisted of the following regressors: R1) A boxcar function 
for the choice period on all trials; R2) R1 modulated by the value of $Self on each trial; R3) R1 
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modulated by the value of $Partner on each trial; R4) an indicator function of the outcome period 
onset (i.e., a stick function of 0 s duration); R5) R4 modulated by the monetary outcome for self 
on each trial; R6) R4 modulated by the monetary outcome for partner on each trial. Parametric 
modulators were orthogonalized as follows: $Partner was orthogonalized with respect to $Self, 
and outcome for partner was orthogonalized with respect to outcome for self. We then calculated 
the following single-subject contrasts:  $Self vs. baseline, $Partner vs. baseline, and $Self - 
$Partner. All omitted details (e.g., contrast estimates, group-level analyses, etc.) are as in GLM 
1. 
 
 
GLM 3. The third model was designed to identify regions in which activity responded 
monotonically to the stated preference expressed on each trial. It included the following 
regressors of interest: R1) An boxcar function for the choice period, which extends from 
proposal onset to  the  subject’s  response  for  the  trial; R2) R1 modulated by the stated preference 
on each trial; R3) R1 modulated by the value of $Self on each trial; R3) R1 modulated by the 
value of $Partner on each trial; R5) an indicator function of the outcome period onset (i.e., a stick 
function of 0s duration); R6) R5 modulated by the monetary outcome for self on each trial; R7) 
R5 modulated by the monetary outcome for partner on each trial. All omitted details are as in 
GLM 1. 
 
 
PPI 1. We estimated a psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analysis to investigate the 
functional connectivity of the area of right dlPFC associated with generous vs. selfish choices 
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(see ROI Definition below). The analysis proceeded in three steps: 
1. Individual BOLD time-series were computed using the first eigenvariate of the time 
series within a sphere (4 mm radius) centered on individual subject peak sensitivity 
generous vs. selfish choices (GLM1) within a functional mask of the right dlPFC region 
that that exhibited stronger response in GLM at the time of choice during generous 
compared to selfish choice trials (see ROI definition below).  
2. Seed time-courses were deconvolved based on the formula for the canonical 
hemodynamic response, in order to construct a time series of neural activity in rdlPFC.  
This was done following the procedures described in 50.   
3. A GLM was estimated with the following regressors: R1) an interaction between neural 
time series of the region and contrast function for the psychological regressor (generous 
choice period = +1, selfish choice period = -1) on all trials. R2) the psychological 
variable (R1–R3 in GLM1), and R3) the first BOLD eigenvariate time series from the 4 
mm sphere. 
 
The first two regressors were convolved with a canonical form of the hemodynamic response. 
The model also included motion parameters as regressors of no interest. Single subject contrasts 
for the first regressor were calculated and submitted to one-sample t-test to determine group 
activations. 
 
PPI 2. We estimated a second PPI to investigate functional connectivity of the left TPJ region 
associated with $Partner in GLM 2 and stated preferences in GLM 3 (see ROI Definition and 
Analyses below).  All details are identical to PPI 1, with the following differences: 
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1. Individual BOLD time series were computed of average activation within a sphere (4 mm 
radius) centered on individual subject peak sensitivity to $Partner (see GLM1) within a 
functional mask of the left TPJ. 
2. Individual peaks within this mask were identified using this same contrast. 
3. The psychological variable used to determine R1 and R2 of the GLM consisted of all 
choice periods, regardless of whether the subject chose generously (R1 from GLM 2). 
 
ROI Definition and Analyses. For use in small-volume correction, we defined four regions 
anatomically using WFU PickAtlas (http://fmri.wfubmc.edu/software/PickAtlas), with a dilation 
of 3 mm to ensure full coverage of an area. The mPFC mask included bilateral anterior cingulate 
cortex, rectus, and medial orbitofrontal gyrus from the AAL atlas (2,733 voxels total). This 
region encompasses the peak voxels related to value computation in several independent 
studies27,29,32,37. The striatum encompassed the head of the caudate bilaterally from the Talairach 
Daemon atlas (438 voxels).  The dlPFC was defined using a combined bilateral mask of the 
middle frontal and inferior frontal gyrus (6,085 voxels total). The TPJ region included bilateral 
angular and superior temporal gyrus, posterior to y = -40 (1975 voxels), a region which 
encompassed peaks of activation from several studies of theory-of-mind16,18,40. 
We also defined four regions based on functional criteria and extracted specific contrasts of 
interest from each: 1) The right dlPFC defined by the set of voxels where group activity was 
significantly greater on generous compared to selfish trials (GLM 1), at p < .001, uncorrected. 
Parameter estimates of the contrast between generous vs. selfish choice (R1–R3 in GLM 1) for 
all voxels included in the mask were averaged to extract a single value for this region. This 
estimate was correlated with differences in reaction time, differences in vmPFC correlation with 
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preference on generous vs. selfish choices, response in the vmPFC to generous choice veto, and 
average generosity levels. 2) A region of the vmPFC showing a significant negative PPI with the 
right dlPFC (PPI 1, R1, thresholded at p < .001, uncorrected). The average parameter estimate of 
the difference in stated preference during generous vs. selfish choice (R2–R4 in GLM 1) was 
extracted from this region and correlated with dlPFC response during generous vs. selfish 
choices. 3) The left angular gyrus/TPJ and 4) rostral ACC regions were defined by the set of 
overlapping voxels that correlated both with $Partner in GLM 2 and stated preference in GLM 3, 
both thresholded at p < .0005, uncorrected. Parameter estimates for the difference of $Partner vs. 
$Self (R3–R2 in GLM 2) were extracted from each of these regions and correlated with response 
to generous choice veto in the vmPFC (see below), average generosity, and dlPFC response 
during generous choice. 
To examine responses to generous choice veto vs. receipt, we defined a fifth vmPFC region 
(independent of functional activations in the current study) related to the subjective pleasantness 
of outcomes, using a sphere (6 mm radius) centered on the coordinates of activation described by 
a previous study of hedonic encoding (see Figures 2 and 4)36. This measure was correlated with 
activity from the function ROIs defined above. 
To minimize the influence of outliers on conclusions drawn from these ROI analyses, all 
correlations used robust regression. To make the robust regression coefficient equivalent to a 
standard correlation statistic, the dependent and independent variables were normalized prior to 
regression. 
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